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Changing threat postures from the Soviet Union and the
recent conclusion of a very lopsided war in the Middle East
have citizens and policy makers critically questioning the
military's composition, size and mission.
A smaller military combined with significant acquisition
policy changes, face the military acquisition community of the
future. In order to exist within that new acquisition
environment, Program Managers will have to fully understand
that environment. The Program Manager will especially need to
research the congressional - DoD relationship.
It is Congress who authorizes and appropriates funds for
DoD acquisition programs. It is also Congress who conducts
aggressive oversight of acquisition programs that can affect
the PM' s leadership of an acquisition program. Developing an
understanding about these interactions is the PM' s best
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Fiscal realities of the post cold war era will present
challenges to the Department of Defense Acquisition System
unlike any that have been experienced in the past . Changing
threat postures from the Soviet Union and the recent
conclusion of a very lopsided war in the Middle East have
citizens and policy makers critically questioning the
military's composition, size and mission. Those fundamental
doubts have rocked the military acquisition community at its
very foundation. On 24 January, 1992, the New York Times
reported that a Department of Defense proposal may make
traditional military acquisitions obsolete:
In a shift that could save billions of dollars in
future military spending, the Pentagon plans to suspend
production of most new weapons after developing test
models, senior Defense Department officials said today.
The production phase is by far the most expensive stage
in buying new weapons, consuming 35 to 45 percent of the
total cost, while the research, design and development of
test models, or prototypes, usually represents 20 to 25
percent
.
Congress will ultimately decide whether the new plan
goes into effect through its control over the Pentagon
budget, and opposition appears likely because lawmakers,
while generally favoring cuts in military spending, do not
like to slash weapons manufacturing that benefits their
districts and states.
Few argue for a total abandonment of our military.
Threats to the stability of our nation continue to exist in
1
various forms and locations. The composition and size of the
force to meet that threat are up for considerable debate. It
is evident though, that a significant downsizing of the
military is going to occur. That decrease in the size of the
military will affect the way the defense acquisition community
conducts its business. In order to survive the challenges
before them, program and project managers must fully
understand the culture and environment within which their
programs must be pursued. That culture and environment is
significantly shaped by the United States Congress
.
Acquisition managers will have to thoroughly understand
the Congress in order to effectively perform their jobs.
Congress has the ability to exert influence over the Program
Manager and all phases of the military acquisition process.
That process spans a series of phases from Concept Exploration
and Definition through a Major System Upgrade or System
Retirement . Congress authorizes and appropriates funds to
those programs throughout the acquisition phases. Congress
has the constitutional right and obligation to oversee the
spending of appropriated funds. One of the major uses of
appropriated funds is acquiring military equipment for the
Department of Defense (DoD) . The DoD in turn develops the
system for eventual fielding to military units
.
This thesis, entitled, "The Legislative Role in the
Military Acquisition Process," will examine how the
legislative branch interacts with and oversees the military
acquisition process within the Department of Defense and the
military Services . It will focus on the Concept Exploration
and Definition Phase, Demonstration and Validation Phase,
Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase, and
Production and Deployment Phase of the acquisition process.
The thesis is written as an instructional tool or guide
to assist individuals in the acquisition field to understand
how to interact with Congress in the management of programs.
It will also examine the motivational factors behind
congressional influence. The thesis will then examine why a
Project/Program Manager needs to understand this interaction
with Congress. Lastly, the thesis will suggest ways of using
congressional influence to actually strengthen a program. The
research questions to be answered, discussion, scope of the
thesis, methodology, chapter outline, and benefits of the
study are outlined below.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is: What is the effect that
Congress has on the Military Acquisition Process?
Subsidiary research questions include:
1
.
During what specific phases of the Acquisition Process
do Congress and DoD Service officials interface?
2 What is the nature of this interaction? What are the
purposes and implications of this interaction? What is the
motivation behind Congress' interaction?
3. How will the Project/Program manager benefit from
understanding the role of Congress? Can congressional
intervention be anticipated? What Program Manager response
to congressional intervention would be considered
appropriate?
4 . Are there historical examples that illuminate the
congressional effect on the acquisition process?
C. DISCUSSION
Congress has the ability to exert influence over
different aspects of the military acquisition process. This
thesis will explore the nature and purpose of this influence.
The acquisition process includes a series of phases from
Concept Exploration and Definition to a Major Upgrade or
System Replacement. Throughout this process the Program
Manager will encounter oversight and potential micromanagement
from the Congress. How the PM handles this interaction may
well determine the future of his program. There are correct
and incorrect ways for the PM to respond to Congress. This
thesis will examine various courses of action for the PM to
take in response to congressional inquiries. It will also
address appropriate attributes those responses should include.
D. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
This thesis has been written for Program Managers or
students of the acquisition process. It is intended to
examine how members of Congress interact with the acquisition
process. Specifically, the thesis will address how Congress
may affect the Program Manager in the management of his
program.
The intent of this thesis is not to affix blame on the
Congress or the Department of Defense for the problems in the
acquisition process. It is rather, written to be
instructional by nature to provide insights as to where
problems exist. After identifying the problem areas, the




Most of the research data will be taken from
congressional records, defense periodicals, and texts.
Personal interviews with congressional staff and
DoD/Department of the Army Pro ject /Program offices, and other
individuals involved with the two organizations being studied
will provide additional information for this research. A
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) and Defense
Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) search of
literature will also be conducted.
F. CHAPTER OUTLINE
I. INTRODUCTION - The introduction will identify the two
organizations under study - Congress and the armed forces.
The chapter will briefly outline the objectives and
organization of the thesis.
II. THE ACQUISITION PROCESS - This chapter will begin
with a brief description of the acquisition process from
Concept Exploration and Definition through Production and
Deployment. The examination of the process will include
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) as an
integral part of the acquisition process.
III. CONGRESS - GOOD POLICY, PAROCHIALISM AND REELECTION
- Why is Congress interested in the acquisition process? This
chapter will examine the motivation associated with
congressional oversight and defense budgeting.
IV. CONGRESS AND THE ACQUISITION PROCESS - WHERE THE
TWAIN MEET - This chapter will examine the ways and means used
by Congress to affect defense acquisition. It will also
address congressional and DoD initiatives to reform the
acquisition process.
V. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT - This
chapter will look at documented examples of congressional
intervention into defense acquisition programs and indicate
lessons learned for program management
.
VI . PROGRAM MANAGERS - PUPPET OR PUPPETEER - How can the
Program/Project Manager anticipate and interact with Congress
to improve project management?
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - This chapter will
summarize the findings of the research. It will then
recommend the best course of action for the Program Manager to
take in dealing with the congressional environment.
G. BENEFITS OF STUDY
Decreasing defense dollars and increased congressional
oversight pose significant challenges to the acquisition
process. It will be critical for Program Managers to
understand every aspect of the environment within which their
program will be developed. An integral part of that
environment is congressional influence. This study will
identify obstacles to weapons acquisition programs while
offering solutions to those obstacles. In a time of
increasing congressional oversight, this study attempts to
identify issues before they actually occur. The ability to
foresee problems before they occur will be invaluable in
today's fiscally constrained climate.
The analysis will also address congressional and DoD
initiatives to reform the acquisition process. Those reforms
could potentially save taxpayer dollars.
The thesis will be distributed to the acquisition faculty
of the Naval Postgraduate School. A copy will also be
furnished to the Director of the Army Acquisition Corps.
H. CONCLUDING INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
It is important at the outset of this thesis to
understand who the major participants in the acquisition
process are. According to J. Ronald Fox author of Defense
Management Challenge , the major participants include:
The Congress, the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) , the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) , the
Office of the Service Secretary, the service headquarters
staff, the military service material commands (the
location of the program management offices), and industry.
Each of the participants in the acquisition process
exercises an oversight responsibility to ensure that laws
and regulations are observed and programs pursued
efficiently. Consequently, there are numerous oversight
and monitoring agencies . The executive branch has the
Justice Department and the Office of Management and Budget;
the Department of Defense and each military service has an
independent inspector general and auditing office; and
Congress uses the General Accounting Office (GAO) for
program audits and assessment, the Congressional Budget
Office for budget and program cost estimates, and the
Congressional Research Service and Office of Technology
Assessment for analyses. Industry has its legal resources,
Washington representatives, and industry associations to
protect its interests. The government manager of a major
systems acquisition program must be sensitive to all
participants' positions and their vested interests." [Ref.
8:pp. 18-19]
Throughout the evolution of the United States, the
Congress has expanded its sphere of influence into many
significant areas of national concern. While much has been
written about the expanding role of the executive branch
versus the expanding role of Congress, there is actually a
dynamic, not static, pattern of activity between the
legislative and executive branches. First one, and then the
other may be perceived as the predominant branch, and various
periods are characterized as times of "congressional
government" or "presidential government." In short, the
American political system is largely a congressional and
presidential Government. [Ref . 14 :pp . 3-5]
The size and constitution of our national defense is an
example of this evolution. Executing constitutional powers,
Congress approves and appropriates dollars for defense
programs. That process allows Congress to set manpower levels
for the Services, allocates division quantities to the Army,
sets ship levels for the Navy's carrier battle groups and
decides what weapon systems are produced or continued.
It is within this framework that military acquisitions
occur. The Congress and the military acquisition community
have a complicated relationship to describe and understand. In
order for military acquisitions to survive within a shrinking
fiscal environment, Program Managers must understand the
relationship and make it work for their benefit.
II. THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
The Department of Defense on 23 February 1991, released
the long awaited revisions to DoD Directive 5000.1, "Defense
Acquisition"; DoD Instruction 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition
Management Policies and Procedures"; and DoD Manual 5000. 2-M,
"Defense Acquisition Management Documents and Reports." These
documents canceled more than 60 previous regulations and
instructions. This two year effort by the Department of
Defense is designed to be the interface between the Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System, the requirements generation,
and acquisition management.
This Chapter, which describes the DoD acquisition system,
incorporates the changes that the new "5000 Series" requires.
The new acquisition milestones and phases of the new
regulation are depicted in Figure 1
.
B. PROGRAM INITIATION
Acquisition programs in the Department of Defense (DoD)
are begun in a myriad of ways . Many programs are initiated as
a result of a Mission Area Analysis (MAA) . This analysis
occurs prior to a formal project initiation and the selection
of a Program Manager. The MAA begins with a DoD threat
10
analysis which identifies a potential security threat to the
United States or a defense operational mission need.
Once a deficiency is noted in the country' s warfighting
capability, a Mission Need Statement (MNS) is drafted. The
MNS is one of two documents needed to initiate the start of an
acquisition program. The MNS is then submitted to the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) . If the JROC approves
the concept outlined in the MNS they forward it to the Defense
Acquisition Board (DAB) for a Milestone review.




















During phase the other project initiation document is
drafted. The Operational Requirements Document (ORD)
describes the performance and capabilities the system must
exhibit. The ORD is an iterative document that is updated
prior to each milestone event. It is also used to update the
program baseline during each phase of the acquisition process.
A second method of program initiation occurs outside the
Department of Defense in the private sector. Industry or
research and development laboratories discover new
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technologies that offer the Department of Defense a new
defense capability that was not before available. Industry
representatives search out military sponsors and attempt to
sell their concept to them. The contractor will offer
assistance to the military sponsor, within legal guidelines,
until the idea evolves into a military requirement.
Once a requirement has been established it is formally
proposed with the Program Initiation Document. The document
may be included as a part of the Program Objectives Memorandum
(POM) in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) or
it may be submitted separately. The approval of concepts
study approval by the approving authority signifies permission
to proceed into the Concept Exploration Definition Phase. The
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2 states that:
Milestone 0, Concept Studies Approval, marks the
initial formal interface between the requirements
generation and acquisition management systems. As a result
of this review, studies are conducted of alternative
material concepts to identify the most promising potential
solution(s) to validated user needs. [Ref . 21 :p . 2-1]
(Figure 2 identifies the four acquisition categories with
corresponding milestone decision authorities) . The four
acquisition categories (ACATs) are further defined by DoDI
5000.2: [Ref .21:p.2-2]
Accruisition Category I . These are major defense
acquisition programs. They have unique statutorily imposed
acquisition strategy, execution, and reporting
requirements . Milestone decision authority for these
programs shall be:
a. Accruisition category I D : Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition or, if delegated by the Under
Secretary,
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b. Acquisition category I C : Cognizant DoD Component
Head or, if delegated, the DoD Component Acquisition
Executive
.
Acquisition Category II . These are major systems.
They have unique statutorily imposed requirements in the
test and evaluation area and may have statutorily imposed
requirements in other areas such as Defense Enterprise
Programs and multiyear procurement. Milestone decision
authority for these programs shall be delegated no lower
than the DoD Component Acquisition Executive.
Acquisition Category III and IV . The additional
distinction of acquisition categories III and IV allow DoD
Component Acquisition Executives to delegate milestone
decision authority to the lowest level deemed appropriate
within their respective organizations . These programs may
also have statutorily imposed requirements in areas such as
Live Fire Test and Evaluation and multiyear procurement.
Spending thresholds or congressional interest will
determine which acquisition program falls within which ACAT
level. The Milestone Decision authority is dictated by which
ACAT the DoD acquisition program falls within.
ACQUISITION CATEGORIES






ACAT IC: Service HQ Review
Designated by USD(A)
Decision by Svc Secretary or
Service Acquisition Executive (SAE)
ACAT II: Does not meet ACAT I Criteria
Designated by Svc Secretary/SAE
Decision by Svc Secretary/SAE
ACAT III: Does not meet ACAT I or II Criteria
Designated by SAE
Decision at lowest appropriate level
ACAT IV: All others
Designated by SAE









The Concept Exploration Phase is formally begun with a
concept studies approval and funding approval
. The purpose of
this phase is to examine and evaluate alternative conceptual
approaches to fulfill the statement of need outlined in the
Mission Need Statement (MNS)
.
During the Concept Exploration Phase members of industry,
universities, research and development centers and other non-
profit institutions attempt to develop conceptual approaches
to meet the stated need. The objective of this phase is to
select the most promising concepts for the Demonstration and
Validation Phase.
C. PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION
While industry is conducting its research, the program
office is concurrently developing a business framework and
acquisition strategy that will guide their program. The
Program Manager is already trying to develop rudimentary cost,
schedule and performance parameters for his program. Other
members within the program office are developing a host of
plans, papers and documents to fulfill the milestone
reporting requirements. One of the goals of the new "5000
series" was to adopt a common sense approach to the milestone
review documentation concept. The DoDI 5000.2 states that:
Milestone reviews require rigorous assessments of a
program's status and plans for the future. The information
needs of the milestone decision authority and supporting
staffs at each level, however, must be satisfied without
creating an undue burden on the Program Manager.
Accordingly, the milestone review documentation concept
14
established by this Instruction, highlighted in Figure 3,
provides for:
- Stand-alone supporting documentation requirements,
and
- Two standardized information displays, the
Integrated Program Summary and the Integrated
Program Assessment
.
The purposes of the stand-alone supporting
documentation are to comply with applicable statutorily
imposed requirements, such as the Test and Evaluation
Master Plan and Independent Cost Estimate, and to meet the
information needs of the milestone decision authority,
supporting staff, and review forum.
The military program office prepares the Integrated
Program Summary to provide a succinct integrated picture of
the program' s status for use by the milestone decision
authority, supporting staff, and review forums.
The Integrated Program Assessment prepared by the DAB
staff, summarizes the results of the independent
assessments conducted by the supporting staff and review
forums. It is a major issue oriented document and provides
















t MlOGHAM Uft-CVCLI COST
ESTIMATE SUMMARY
c ACQUISITION STRATEGY REPORT *
ms« ASSESSMENT












4. MOST PROMISING ALTERNATTVt
I RATIONALE
5. ACQUISITION STRATEGY
4. COST 0RTVT.RS1 MAJOR
TRAOf-OfTS
7. RISC ASSESSMENTS IMAMS TO
REDUCE RISK










1 ALTERNATIVE S ASSESSEO t
RESULTS
«. MOST PROMISING ALTERNATIVE
1 RATIONALE
J. ACQWSmON STRATEGY
C COST ORTVERS I MAJOR
TRAOE-OffS
7. RISK ASSESSMENTS* PLANS TO
RiOOCIRISK





During the Concept Exploration and Definition Phase of
the program, the milestone review documentation is updated as
the system becomes more mature. Conceptual estimates about
cost, schedule and performance become more realistic as the
design progresses. The Systems Engineer, in conjunction with
the Program Manager, is developing life-cycle cost (LCC)
estimates and logistic support plans for a program that
initially consists of a couple of conceptual studies.
It is important to understand that all of these plans and
initial reports are estimates that will be refined as the
program becomes more mature. At best, broad program cost,
schedule, and operational effectiveness goals and thresholds
are established.
D. MILESTONE I REVIEW
The capstone event in the Concept Exploration and
Definition Phase is the Milestone I Review. 1 It is during
this review process that the Milestone Decision Authority
(MDA) examines the program' s potential to proceed into the
Demonstration and Validation Phase. The MDA also examines the
program initiation documentation to determine if the system
need is still valid to the Department of Defense. The Defense
Acquisition Board (DAB) , under the direction of the Defense
xThe Milestone I Review is now considered under the new "5000
series" as the formal program initiation point. Under the old




Acquisition Executive (DAE) , reviews the Milestone Review
Documentation and, after an Integrated Logistic System Audit
and Certification is completed, the DAE makes his decision and
provides his guidance through the Acquisition Decision
Memorandum (ADM) . 2 The ADM is the decision document that
authorizes the program to proceed into the Demonstration and
Validation Phase. When the ADM is formally approved, the
program has moved from being a concept to being formally
recognized as an acquisition program.
Figure 4 depicts a timeline of the sequence of
documentation review events leading to a Milestone I DAB
review. The Demonstration and Validation Phase formally
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2For a complete listing and description of the Defense
Acquisition Board, see the Department of Defense Instruction
5000.2, part 13, page 13-A-l.
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E. THE DEMONSTRATION AND VALIDATION PHASE
During this phase, various technical approaches are
explored to develop the approved concepts to initial
prototype. Engineers attempt to demonstrate that the needed
technology is presently at hand, thus reducing levels of risk
that an exploratory development would demand. Exploratory
developments are very risky because not all the technology
required by the system have yet been refined. Reducing
technical risk to acceptable levels is a major goal of the D&V
Phase
.
Systems and design engineers oversee the development of
brass-boards and prototypes, conduct tradeoff analyses, and
conduct test and evaluation to demonstrate that the technology
is available. Most programs are concurrently developing two
or more technical approaches to explore and compare
competitive prototypes
.
Throughout this phase, the program manager and his staff
are updating existing plans and preparing other necessary
reports for the Milestone II review. They are also conducting
design reviews, validating engineering approaches, conducting
trade-off analyses of threshold capabilities, developing cost
estimates, preparing the allocated concept baseline
configuration and other milestone review documents to initiate
the Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase.
The objectives of this phase, according to the DoDI
5000.2, are to: [Ref . 21 :p . 3-14]
18
- Better define the critical design characteristics and
expected capabilities of the system concept (s),
- Demonstrate that the technologies critical to the most
promising concept (s) can be incorporated into system
design (s) with confidence,
- Prove that the processes critical to the most promising
system concept (s) are understood and attainable,
- Develop the analyses/information needed to support a
Milestone II decision, and
- Establish a proposed Development Baseline containing
refined program cost, schedule, and performance
objectives for the most promising design approach.
J. Ronald Fox, an expert in the acquisition field and
author of, The Defense Management Challenge , outlines six
criteria for obtaining a decision to proceed to engineering
development (Milestone II). [Ref.8:p.26]
1. Demonstrate engineering, rather than experimental,
effort
.





Selection of the best-perceived technical
approaches
.
4 A thorough trade-off analysis
.
5. Comparison of the cost effectiveness for the
proposed weapon system and competing systems within DoD,
concluding that the proposal is feasible.
6. Credible and acceptable cost and schedule estimates.
Fox and the DoDI 5000.2 succinctly outlined the critical
areas that must be successfully conducted prior to the
Milestone II review. The Program Manager, while focusing on
the above goals, is also constantly reexamining and further
defining the program goals, objectives, and milestone
documentation in preparation of the Defense Acquisition Board
Milestone II review. Figure 5 depicts the milestone
documentation required for each milestone review.
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F. MILESTONE II REVIEW
According to the DoDI 5000.2, the Milestone II objective
is to: [Ref .21:p.3-18]
- Determine if the results of Phase I, Demonstration and
Validation, warrant continuation and
Establish a Development Baseline containing refinedprogram cost, schedule, and performance objectives for aprogram approved for continuation.
DOCUMENTS REQUIRED FOR
MILESTONE DECISION REVIEW
DOCUment (formal In OoO 5000 2-MI Milestone
R«qulr«d
by
Congrtti6 1 II mi IV
Mission Need Statement (MNS) X
Ooentional Requirements Document (ORD) X X X X
System Threat Assessment Reoort X X X X
Integrated Program Summary UPS) X X X X
Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate X X X X
Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) X X X X yea
Test a Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) X X X X yea
Manpower Estimate Reoort (MER) X X yea
LRIP Reoort lor Naval Vessels 4 Satellites X yea
Live Fire Test 4 Evaluation Waiver X yea
ComDOtltive Prototyping Strategy (CPS) Waiver X yea
Indeoendent Cost Estimate (ICE) X X X X yea
Cost & Operational Effectiveness Analysis ICOEA) X X X X
Early Operational Assessment Report X
Operational Test 4 Evaluation Report X yea
Development Test 4 Evaluation Report X X
Defense Intelligence Agency IDIA) Report y y y y y
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Report y y / y
Integrated Program Assessment (IPA) J j y y
Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) Report J j y y yea
Live Fire Test 4 Evaluation Reoort y yea
Beyond Low Rate Initial Production (LRlPI Reoort y yea
Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) J J j y y
<>'taMita or PM/ / Prepared by OSO suit
Figure 5
G. ENGINEERING AND MANUFACTURING DEVELOPMENT PHASE
If phase I ends with a Milestone II approval, then the
program can proceed with the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Phase (E&MD)
.
This phase includes costly
engineering efforts that are used to develop the best
technical approach (es) into preproduction designs. The
20
program office is also concurrently designing and fabricating
training aids, computer software and necessary items to
support the final design.
The objective of the E&MD phase is to demonstrate the
best engineering design with respect to system performance,
cost and schedule constraints. After an acceptable prototype
is designed, the product baseline configuration design and
Milestone Review Documentation are developed in preparation of
the Milestone III review. The DoDI 5000.2 states that the
objectives of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Phase are to: [Ref . 21 :p . 3-21
]
- Translate the most promising design approach developed
in Phase I, Demonstration and Validation, into a stable,
producible and cost effective system design,
- Validate the manufacturing or production process, and
- Demonstrate through testing that the system capabilities
meet contract specification requirements . The system
capabilities satisfy the mission need and meet minimum
acceptable operational performance requirements.
1 . Three Sub-Phases of the Engineering and
Manufacturing Development Phase
The Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Phase can be typically broken down into three subphases
:
engineering, prototyping, and low rate initial production.
The three subphases are not a formal breakout of the E&MD
Phase, but the result of proven engineering practices. The
subphases assist the Program Manager and System Engineer with
the difficult transition from developmental engineering to
production. The Program Manager is also concurrently
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overseeing other iterative program management activities in
preparation of the Milestone III review. Those other
activities of the Program Manager include: updating milestone
review documentation, validating system threat assessment,
refining the acquisition strategy, and completing a system
configuration baseline.
2. Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP)
Even though the Program Manager has a tested
stable design, he must exhibit that it can be produced.
Milestone Ila (Low Rate Initial Production) is a production
technique that is used to prove that the system is producible.
During the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase the
weapon system, using R&D funds, is constructed using
production processes and tooling. Testing of the finished
product ensures that the production process is in control and
ready for full scale production and deployment to the field.
At this point the program is ready for a formal Milestone III
review
.
H. MILESTONE III REVIEW
At this point, the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) has
many decision options that he can impose. First, the MDA may
approve full production. This occurs when the system passes
all cost, schedule and performance tests. The system must
also demonstrate operational effectiveness as well as proving
the system can be operationally supported. Second, the MDA
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might decide to approve limited production. 3 Approval for
limited production signifies that the system is close to
approval for full production, but may have deficient test
results or supportability reviews to complete. Third, the
Milestone Decision Authority may decide to not approve the
system for production. Failure of a major test (Technical
Evaluation or Operational Evaluation) will kill any chance of
getting the system to production. The MDA may send the
program back for reengineering or cancel the program at this
point
.
I. PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT PHASE
Successful completion of the Milestone III Review moves
the program into Phase III - Production and Deployment. At
this point the system should have a stable design with proven
production technology. The system should still meet the need
that initially began the program.
Existing plans within the program guide the production of
the hardware, software, field distribution, support operations
and necessary soldier training. Careful program office
planning, conducted since the Concept Exploration and
Definition Phase, should allow a smooth transition into the
Production and Deployment Phase.
3The decision for limited production is limited to ACAT II
programs and below. It does not apply to ACAT I decisions.
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As observed in the other acquisition phases, the Program
Manager must carefully review the guidance from the Milestone
Decision Authority (provided in the Acquisition Decision
Memorandum) to ensure that any direction to the program has
been incorporated in the production plan. The Program Manager
must also carefully review all cost, schedule and performance
data to ensure he can successfully meet the Initial Operating
Capability (IOC) date. The PM must aggressively manage this
phase to avoid long delays between Milestone III and the IOC.
During the production process, the Program Manager must
work closely with the prime contractor to assist with problems
occurring with the production process. Even though the
contractor has the primary responsibility for production
within his factory, the PM must be aware of any problems that
occur with the production process . Many PMs work side-by-side
with contractors to overcome problem areas. If the contractor
has a problem, the Program Manager has a problem. Many
Program Managers visit the prime contractor and the prime
contractor' s subcontractors to ensure their operations are
meeting cost, schedule and performance objectives.
One of the keys to successful program management is
honest, open communications with the contractor. To
facilitate contract administration and improve the military
program office - contractor communication process, Defense
Plant Representative Offices (DPROs) are placed in
contractor's plants. The DPRO Administrative Contracting
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Officer is used as a direct liaison between the contractor and
the Program's Procuring Contracting Officer.
Even after the production line is underway, the Program
Manager must undertake the large task of system deployment and
fleet support. While planning for this effort has been
underway for years, the execution of the plan is a monumental
task. Careful planning in regard to soldier training (both
operator and support) must now be implemented. Deployment
plans and priorities must be finalized and executed. Fielding
teams must be mobilized to take the system to the field.
The Army uses New Equipment Training Teams (NETT) to
deploy systems to the field. The Army NETT fielding team
consists of a contractor and program office fielding team.
They bring with them the capability to field the system,
repair the system, train the soldiers in operations and
repair, and deliver a package of repair parts to support the
initial fielding. The NETT team stays on location until the
fielding is complete and soldiers are trained.
The Production and Deployment Phase makes the difficult
transition into the Operations and Support Phase on the
Initial Operating Capability (IOC) date. This Phase includes
all operational support that will be required throughout the
service life of the system.
The system's life cycle finally concludes with the
systems retirement or major block upgrade/modification.
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III. CONGRESS - GOOD POLICY, PAROCHIALISM AND REELECTION
A. INTRODUCTION
The architects of the Constitution of the United States




The executive branch, which consists of the President,
Vice-President and supporting agencies
.
2. The judicial branch, consisting of the Supreme Court and
the Federal judicial system.
3 The legislative branch, a bicameral organization
consisting of a 100 member Senate, 435 member House of
Representatives, personal and professional staffs and
supporting agencies.
B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Throughout the history of the United States, the three
branches' spheres of influence have been in a constant state
of flux. The relationship between the executive and
legislative branch is especially interesting. First one, and
then the other, has been perceived as the predominant branch
of Government. Some periods have been characterized as times




It is quite accurate to assess the governmental process as
both congressional and presidential. Between them exists a
common understanding that an adversarial relationship
diminishes their ability to govern. Yet, conflicting opinions
between the two often serve the best interests of the
constituents. This separation of power was designed by the
drafters of the constitution to ensure that power be equally
divided between the executive, judicial, and legislative
branches of the government. They fully envisioned the healthy
conflicts that would ensue between the branches. The
conflicts are healthy because they force the branches to
compromise and cooperate with each other. The separation of
powers also ensures no one branch will become the overall
dominant governing body.
One area that Congress and the executive branch have
significant disagreements over is the formation of the Federal
budget. Of particular interest to the Department of Defense
and the defense acquisition community is the defense portion
of that budget
.
C. THE DEFENSE BUDGET
Once Congress receives the President's budget, it drafts
legislation to transform the request into law. The Department
of Defense has its budget funded through two pieces of
legislation. The first piece of legislation is the
authorization bill, which authorizes programs and determines
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the maximum amount of money that can be spent on those
programs. The other piece of legislation is the
appropriations bill which provides the actual budget authority
allocated to each authorized program. The congressional
budget process or enactment process includes the authorization
and appropriation bills, preceded by a concurrent budget
resolution in both Houses which sets budget limits for defense
and all other programs. Upon successful enactment of this
legislation, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
conducts the actual apportionment of money to DoD . OMB is
also responsible for the budget execution, obligation or
spending of the money.
D. HIDDEN AGENDAS
The congressional budget process is very complicated and
cumbersome. Further complicating the process are the hidden
agendas of the individual military Services. The military
Services who are developing the plans and strategies have
their own private agendas. The Navy and Marine Corps, Army,
and Air Force are independent Services looking out for their
own best interests. As Jacques Gansler, the author of
Affording Defense put it, "the decisions about which weapons
to buy, and how many of them, are made by the independent
services - almost as if they were going to fight separate
wars." Gansler also noted, "Far too often, the selection and
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budgeting of weapon systems determines the military strategy,
rather than vice versa." [Ref.9:p.6]
E. CONGRESSIONAL MOTIVATION
Members of Congress are motivated by three primary
desires: the desire to enact good public policy, the desire to
take care of their constituents (parochial interests) , and the
desire to be reelected. When all three "desires" can be
attained at the same time on a piece of legislation, the
political system works very smoothly. But this occurs
infrequently. Quite often, congressional desires are in
direct conflict with one another. At this point the elected
official must decide among good policy, parochial interests
and reelection wishes. All too often the parochial interests
of the constituents back home come first in an effort to
positively sway the politician's reelection campaign.
One area where this is very true is in the enactment of
defense related legislation. Historically, the defense budget
was an ideal vehicle to bring tax dollars home to the
constituents. Today's fiscally restrictive environment,
combined with a public outcry for a "peace dividend, " have
made the defense budget a prime target for cuts. This
presents a dichotomy for members of Congress . On one hand,
they desire a smaller defense budget. On the other, their
parochial desires want to bring home greater defense dollars
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to their districts. The two desires are in conflict with one
another and cannot both be accomplished.
Congressional competition for the shrinking defense dollar
is fierce. Yet Congress cannot ignore the public outcry for
the "peace dividend." Hence, once thriving acquisition
programs are now fighting for their very existence. Program
Managers are expected to "do more with less." One technique
being employed by Congress to reduce short term costs is
simply to reduce the order quantity of a system (e.g., instead
of ordering 500 tanks this year, only order 400) . On the
surface this seems like a reasonable short term measure to
reduce costs. But such direct cuts or "program stretch outs"
significantly raise the costs of each copy of a weapon system.
Increased costs are a direct result of increased labor costs
of salaried employees allocated to fewer end items, plant
operations at less than optimum production levels, and
inability to take advantage of economic order quantity
purchases of materials and systems.
While the tactic of stretching programs out decreases
costs in the short run, it actually increases acquisition
program costs significantly. Higher program costs attract
congressional attention. A vicious circle has been created in
the attempt to obtain short term savings.
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F. THE INDUSTRIAL BASE
The same program reductions are beginning to have a
significant impact on the industrial base. Program stretch
outs are making it unprofitable for defense contractors to
stay in the industry. Many contractors are facing the point
where it will be financially infeasible to keep open a defense
plant rather than operate below the breakeven point. Other
contractors react to the bleak prospects of obtaining
lucrative defense contracts by leaving the defense industry.
This poses an additional problem for Congress . According to
the 23 January, 1992 Boston Globe report:
But now the Bush administration is shifting to a
technology "rollover" model, which means chugging along
with continual technological innovation but drawing a line
between research and engineering and actual production.
Where it is necessary to preserve a military industrial
capacity, production lines would be kept lukewarm by
refitting existing weapons. New weapons would be developed
but possibly never built.
This is the only way to get the Pentagon budget under
control, but it will be controversial in the defense
industry and Congress. The defense industry profit and
jobs come not from research and development but from
production. If programs are frozen after research and
development, there will be no significant profits.
Industry will leave arms production in droves.
Congress must address the issue of sustaining a defense




G. ACQUISITION FRAUD AND CONGRESS
The environment that Congress is working in is at best
chaotic: fiscal constraints; public outcry for a "peace
dividend"; a shrinking industrial base; military Services with
their own agendas; an adversarial relationship with the
executive branch; and the battle of good policy vs. parochial
interests vs. reelection desires. This climate presents a
formidable personal challenge to each member of Congress as
they confront defense funding issues each year.
To exist in this environment, some members of Congress
have developed a couple of tactics to gain favor in the public
eye. This tactic, uncovering and attacking "acquisition
fraud," is a politically attractive and popular activity. It
gives the perception to the public that the congressman truly
is concerned about the taxpayer and their tax dollars.
Extensive press coverage of such discoveries gives the
congressman desired exposure to the voting public.
Representative Bill Nichols (D.- Ala) used this tactic
quite successfully as depicted by these quotes from Aviation
Week and Space Technology and U.S. News and World Report.
The most recent disclosure of alleged abuse came last
week from the House Armed Services Committee investigation
subcommittee which charged that Hughes Helicopter had been
unable to supply data to support 40% of its challenged
billings to the Defense Department.
Rep. Bill Nichols (D.- Ala), chairman of the
subcommittee, said: The records we found at Hughes were in
a deplorable state. Hughes' accounting system is neither
accountable nor systematic. [Ref.l]
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No aspect of the waste nightmare gets more attention
than spare parts. Examples such as the Navy's purchases of
$17 claw hammers for $435 and 13-cent nuts for $2,043 have
become too frequent to be dismissed as exceptions to the
way the Pentagon conducts business.
"These stories create the impression - and rightly so -
that nobody is minding the store," says Representative
Bill Nichols (D . - Ala.) , chairman of a House Armed Services
subcommittee that has investigated spare-parts abuses.
[Ref .2]
Representative Nichols provides a good example of the type
of scrutiny Government contractors and military program
offices are constantly under. On the surface, it appears
these charges are criticisms of the Hughes Helicopter
Corporation. But it is also critical of the cost controls
that are supposed to be implemented by the military program




Congress has not only the right but also the
Constitutional obligation to conduct the oversight function.
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution gives the Congress
the authority to review Government operations and
administration
.
Many equate the importance of oversight with that of the
authorizing and appropriating functions of Congress. But the
amount of oversight has been increasing over the years. The
White Paper on the Department of Defense and the Congress
states: [Ref.l8:p.l]
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Every recent study of defense management and
organization has concluded that reform of the congressional
defense oversight process is a necessary element in an
effort to improve defense management. Most specific
recommendations have focused on reform of the budget
process, including the annual defense authorization. The
scope and level of detail in the annual congressional
defense budget review has grown significantly over the past
twenty years or more, with many measures of activity
doubling or trebling in short periods...
. . .The duplication, complexity and lack of coordination
in the Congressional defense process is, in itself, a
hindrance to better management to the Defense Department
.
Among the negative results of this process are conflicting
mandates, delays and increased costs in programs (totalling
over half a billion dollars at a minimum) , and instability
in planning. The most damaging aspect of the current
congressional defense process is the degree to which it
consumes the time and attention of defense managers and
members of Congress. Excessive debate over budget details
significantly limits the degree to which Congress and top
defense managers can concentrate on national goals and
strategy or operational and policy matters.





It has proven to be a politically popular activity to
engage in
.
2. To eliminate fraud, waste and abuse in defense
contracting
.
3. Larger Congressional staffs now allow for increased
investigations into defense spending.
4 Vietnam and Watergate significantly weakened the
executive branch of Government; Congress used oversight a
one tool to fill that void.
5. To fulfill the parochial objectives of the members.
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6. The belief that military acquisition programs and
defense contractors cannot deliver within cost, schedule or
performance parameters
.
7. The pursuit of good public policy.
For whatever combination of the above reasons, Congress is
expected by the taxpayers to closely watch the Department of
Defense acquisition activity.
I. THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE SYSTEM
Before any further discussion of the congressional
oversight function can occur, it is critical to examine
Congress as an organization. First, Congress is a political
organization. It has no formal hierarchial structure that a
bureaucracy contains. It conducts the preponderance of its
work through the committee system. One major job delegated to
the committees is the oversight function. James Lindsay,
author of the article, "Congressional Oversight of the
Department of Defense: Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom,"
states
:
Much of Congress's oversight activities are accomplished
through the committee system. The Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946 stipulated that congressional
committees should "exercise continuous watchfulness" over
those actions of the executive branch that fall within
their jurisdiction. Primary responsibility for overseeing
DoD lies with the defense committees - the armed services
committees and defense appropriations subcommittees - which
regularly hold hearings on defense issues. [Ref.l9:p.9]
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Even though Congress has been described as other than a
bureaucratic organization, certain committee assignments carry
more influence than others
.
The defense committees are
considered to be one of the more desirable committees to sit
on. The defense committees provide the members with much
desired publicity. They also provide the legislators with the
opportunity to make important policy decisions. The defense
committees also provide members with parochial interests in
the defense community enhanced opportunities to bring home a
portion of the defense budget.
Members of the defense committees are delegated the
responsibility of overseeing the Department of Defense
operating and spending activities . Lindsay explains why this
is no easy task for the committees:
. . .congressional oversight of DoD faces three additional
obstacles. First, far more than other federal agencies,
the armed services resist congressional oversight . Second,
unlike other policy domains, most DoD programs are designed
to respond to events that occur rarely - namely, wars;
hence, it is often difficult to assess the effectiveness of
defense policy. Third, defense oversight often involves
diplomatically sensitive issues that are ill-suited for
public debate. These three obstacles make it difficult for
Congress to oversee DoD and thereby discourage further
oversight of the Pentagon. [Ref.l9:p.8]
How does Congress attempt to accomplish this formidable
task? One technique used by the committees is the formal
hearing process. Senior Department of Defense officials are
brought forward to answer questions and justify programs.
Other less formal techniques are used by the committees to
conduct the oversight process. Many committee members have
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informal ties into the Department of Defense that provide the
members with timely information. They also look into reports
of cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance problems.
One of the popular misconceptions about congressional
oversight is that it is a systematic review process. Nothing
could be further from the truth. Lindsay states:
. . .how much oversight can Congress reasonably be
expected to accomplish. Even under the best of
circumstances Congress lacks the capacity to act as a
"coordinate budget maker" - to examine thousands of budget
line items and then to reach its own conclusions.
Bemoaning Congress's inability to conduct comprehensive
oversight accomplishes little. As Aaron Wildavsky has
written, "All that is accomplished by injunctions to follow
a comprehensive approach is the inculcation of guilt among
good men who find they can never come close to fulfilling
this unreasonable expectation."
Congress's inability to conduct comprehensive oversight
results partly from constraints on legislators' time.
Members of Congress simply are too busy to devote a
majority of their time to reviewing the defense budget.
This holds true even for conscientious members of the
defense committees; for example, members of the Senate
defense committees average three committee and nine
subcommittee assignments apiece. In addition, legislators
find their time taken up with (among other things) meeting
with constituents, floor votes, fund raisers, and
campaigning. [Ref . 19 :p . 11]
Problems arise with the manner in which Congress conducts
the oversight function. One of these problems occurs when
Congress engages in line-item budget reviews. This presents
the impression that Congress does not trust the DoD in the
allocation of defense budget dollars. Many argue that
Congress should avoid line item reviews, focusing its
intention instead on broader defense policy issues.
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These line-item budget reviews occasionally create tension
between Congress and the Department of Defense. DoD officials
perceive that members of Congress are second guessing their
expert opinion on military acquisition issues. Congress calls
senior members of the defense community forward to testify in
defense of their recommendations. Many times these hearings
have nothing to do at all with national defense issues. They
instead act as a forum for legislators to pursue parochial
interests for their districts. 1
J . MICROMANAGEMENT
Problems occur between the Congress and the DoD when
legislators step over the fine line between oversight and
micromanagement . As an example of micromanagement, Senator
Sam Nunn (D-Georgia, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee) pointed out that in the 1985 defense-program
review, "Congress changed the number of muzzle bore sights
that the Army requested, told the Navy to reduce its request
for parachute flares, and instructed the Air Force to make do
with fewer garbage trucks." 2
Representative James Courter (R-NJ) stated, "Congress is
not the answer to waste, Congress is the problem. They mean
^ee the Navy F/A-18 Hornet example in Chapter VII.
2Draft report of CSIS Study on Defense Acquisition in the
United States, April 9, 1986.
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well but reformers are too often the cause of whats wrong with
the military." [Ref.3]
Whatever the problems (or perceived problems) of the
congressional oversight process, Program Managers must run
their programs within established congressional parameters
.
The PM' s ability to properly assess the congressional
environment may be his key to developing a successful strategy
that navigates through that environment
.
K. PROGRAM MANAGERS AND CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Program Managers know all too well the results of
congressional oversight. Instead of managing their programs
PMs are spending long hours formulating responses to
congressional staffers' questions. Many months are spent in
Washington, D.C. in order to obtain support and funding for
his program. Some PMs find themselves in Washington fighting
for the very existence of their programs. Whether the Program
Manager agrees or disagrees with the reasons for congressional
oversight really doesn't matter. It is the PM' s obligation to
follow the orders of his chain of command. There are many
times the PM will not be in a position to alter congressional
opinion or policy.
The bottom line is that the PM will be a better leader by
understanding all aspects of his program's environment.
Congressional oversight exists and may alter the way a Program
Manager leads his program.
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IV. CONGRESS AND THE ACQUISITION PROCESS - WHERE THE
TWAIN MEET
A. CONGRESSIONAL MOTIVATION
When discussing the relationship between Congress and the
acquisition process, five key relationships need to be
discussed. First, it is important to reiterate what motivates
the congressional representatives:
- The desire to create good public policy.
- The desire to pursue constituent parochial
interests
.
- The desire to be reelected to public office.
When Congress interacts with the acquisition process it
is in response to one or more of the three "congressional
desires." When a piece of legislation fulfills all three
desires, the law makers have few hesitations in casting their
votes on legislation. Problems occur when the three "desires"
conflict with one another.
When conflicts occur, each member of Congress must
prioritize their desires. According to Senate Armed Services
Committee Staff Member, Jonathan L. Etherton, the priorities
are set based on the political stability of the elected
official. If there is a strong probability that the
congressman will be reelected, he will most likely focus his
efforts on parochial and policy issues. Mr. Etherton further
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elaborated that if a tight reelection race was expected, the
main focus would be on the reelection campaign. 1
Other factors that affect the prioritization process
include: the perceived strength of the public opinion about
the legislation; time before the next election; political
party desires; direct impact on the congressional district;
and strength of the legislation as good public policy.
B. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Second, the Congress is mandated by the constitution to
review Government operations and administration. This review
process, termed "oversight, " is a major source of interaction
between Congress and acquisition programs.
A White Paper Report to the President of the United
States examined congressional oversight responsibility. The
purpose of the White Paper was to "look at the interaction
between DoD and Congress; and to focus on ways the two might
interact more effectively to improve the formulation and
conduct of national defense policy." [Ref .18:p.4] The authors
of the White Paper were critical with the manner in which they
conduct the oversight process. They were particularly critical
with the volume and scope of program interventions.
xThe researcher conducted a personal interview with Mr.
Etherton on 15 January, 1992 at the Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey, California.
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1 . Program Intervention
One type of oversight that specifically affects
the Acquisition Program Manager is program "intervention."
According to the White Paper:
Below the level of general policy, Congress frequently
imposes specific requirements on individual programs or
activities. This White Paper refers to this practice as
program intervention. Program intervention often occurs in
report language or in non-codified statutes such as general
provisions, provisos and limitations. Intervention can
also be exercised through budget adjustments, particularly
those attributed to management or technical concerns, or
additions which do not address valid military requirements.
Committees, members and staff also issue instructions on
specific programs through letters or verbally. Although
the Department is not required to comply with these forms
of guidance as a legal matter, the consequences of ignoring
such advice frequently compel compliance — this year'
s
ignored "suggestion" may become next year's statutory
requirement
.
The most common justification for Congressional
intervention is poor program management. In fact,
monitoring mechanisms which allow committees to review
decisions or to second guess department actions are common,
regardless of program performance, and their proliferation
makes future intervention far more likely. Often, when
specific directions are applied they generally have less to
do with management issues than with funding allocation.
The experience and diversity of views represented in
Congress can, when properly applied, aid in the development
and management of specific programs as well as with broader
policies. And obviously, when a program is troubled,
external examination and advice can be helpful. The volume
and scope of intervention, however, indicate a need to
distinguish the circumstances and methods in which
intervention can be helpful from those in which it is
counter-productive . [Ref . 18 :p . 12]
Intervention can occur in a variety of methods
.
Program Managers are most familiar with written reports
prepared at Congress' request. These reports are intended to
force a review of an activity within DoD or to provide
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Congress with information to monitor or direct department
activities
.
Other forms of intervention include: funding
earmarks; structural requirements; minimum employment levels;
technology limitations and legislative enforcement techniques.
All of the forms of intervention can affect the way a Program
Manager runs his program.
2. The Relationship Between Congress and the DoD
One of the major problems in the acquisition
process deals with the level of trust between Congress and the
DoD. The White Paper states, "A final, critical factor
affecting Congressional defense oversight is a profound lack
of trust. Doubts about the competence of DoD managers result
in micromanagement . " [Ref . 18 :p . 20] The distrust increases the
amount of Congressional oversight that a Program Manager must
cope with.
When discussing the relationship between
Department of Defense acquisition programs and Congress, it is
critical that the Program Manager understands who his friends
and foes are. This identification process is important to the
Program Manager as he assesses risks associated with his
program. The congressional support or opposition will affect
the manner in which the PM conducts the risk management of the
program.
Program Managers realize that acquisition
programs can usually find political support from legislators
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with contractor interests within their states or legislative
districts. As a general rule it would be considered
politically unwise for members of Congress to oppose defense
contracts within their own congressional districts or states.
Conversely, many legislators will not support
programs for many various reasons. It is possible that a
program may be perceived as not being in America' s best
interests or poor public policy. Or, it is quite possible
that a congressman may believe that the cancellation of a
program may give life to one of his programs, supporting
parochial and/or reelection desires. It is also quite
possible that the Program Manager may never figure out why a
legislator supports or doesn't support his program. This
occurs as deals and alliances are forged between legislators
to support each other's parochial interests. Hence, a Program
Manager will find supporters and opponents of his program in
many different camps for many different reasons.
The congressional oversight process will affect
the manner in which a Program Manager runs his program. He
must understand the motivation behind congressional inquiries
in order to respond appropriately. A poor assessment may cost
the program money, or worse yet program cancellation.
C. AUTHORIZATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS
Third, a direct link between Congress and the acquisition
process exists within the authorization and appropriating
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legislative process. It is Congress that determines whether
or not a program will be authorized to exist. If it is
authorized, Congress determines the amount of money to be
appropriated to the acquisition program. Without exception,
the researcher learned that all Program Managers are acutely
aware and concerned about this lengthy and stressful process.
The White Paper states that:
Virtually no other country puts its defense budget
through such a detailed legislative scrutiny every year,
and none has that budget reviewed by as many as six
independently powerful committees: the Budget, Armed
Services and Appropriations Committees of both the House
and Senate. [Ref.l8:p.5]
Such a detailed review process could not have
physically been conducted in the 1960's or 70' s due to a lack
of staffing resources. In order to conduct such an extensive
budget review, Congress required and obtained a larger staff
structure
.
In 1964, the four defense subcommittees on
Appropriations and the Armed Services Committees had a
total of 37 staff members. By 1984, the same committees
and subcommittees had 60 staff. Five years later the
number was up to 99. And that does not include the 66
associate staff who work on defense for individual members
of the same committees, or Congressional support agencies.
From 1960 to 1985 total Congressional committee staffs grew
by 237% and personal staffs by 175%. [Ref . 12 :p . 20]
Clearly, the increased staff structure gives
Congress the ability to conduct budget reviews in much greater
detail. The burden to provide the additional information to
the Congressional Staffers has fallen on the shoulders of the
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Department of Defense which receives the preponderance of
requests for information.
The growth in reporting requirements tracked in an
annual compilation of "Reports Required by Congress" by the
Clerk of the House is striking. The Defense Department
recently passed the President as the largest producer of
reports to Congress, and many of the Presidential reports
are actually prepared by DoD . Between 1980 and 1988 DoD
requirements grew by 224%, far faster than any other part
of the government, and nearly three times the average
growth of other agencies. [Ref . 18 :p. 10]
Hence, the Program Manager must be concerned
about the budget process. He carefully watches the
authorization process to see if his program is going to be
allowed to continue. He further scrutinizes the appropriation
process to see how much budget authority ("money") he has been
granted. He also has his time constrained in the preparation
of reports and testimony for Congress
.
D. CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE AND THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
Fourth, there is an overriding public impression that
Congress is involved with and influences the award process of
defense contracts. Press reports about a WEDTECH type of
scandal imply that the military contract award process is
filled with graft and corruption.
This opinion couldn't be further from the truth. But it
is in fact the legislators themselves that promote this
illusion. Congressmen and senators want constituents to
believe that they were responsible for bringing home a
lucrative defense contract. This activity feeds the parochial
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interests of the politician. He hopes the contract award will
help fuel campaign funds and reelection votes. In essence,
the congressman reaps benefits of a contract award that the
legislator could not have possibly influenced.
Kenneth R. Mayer, author of Arms, Politics and the
Economy , further explains this phenomenon.
Although congressmen and senators do not, as a rule,
have a great deal of influence over DoD source selection,
they often behave as though they do. If members can
convince constituents that they really can determine the
outcome of contract competitions, they can then claim
credit for local awards . Some are blunt in their claims to
influence. Said one: "Every time I go to the Pentagon to
obtain a contract for one of my constituents, I run into
hundreds of retired officers." This credit claiming is
important, as it provides members with many benefits:
reelection funds, votes, campaign workers and the like.
[Ref .17:p.211]
Credit claiming was, until 1970, institutionalized in
contract award announcement procedures. Some legislators,
usually those most sympathetic to the Defense Department, were
given the option of publicly announcing contract awards to
firms in their district or state, prior to release of the news
to the general public. This certainly fostered the impression
that the member' s efforts had a hand in the award,
particularly since the information was selectively provided.
E. CONGRESS AND SUBCONTRACTING
Fifth, while no empirical data exists linking Congress
with the contract award given to the prime contractor, it is
quite evident that the inverse is true with the award of
subcontracts. [Ref . 26 :p . 206] It is the subcontracting process
47
that many believe is the most politically influenced. Kenneth
R. Mayer states:
In many respects, the distribution of subcontracts is
the most political phase of the actual contract award
process
.
Scholars and procurement analysts have long
suspected that prime contractors distribute subcontracts
(which include orders for raw materials, equipment, and
parts not manufactured by the prime) so as to maximize the
geographic spread of acquisition programs. [Ref . 17 :p . 219]
Jacques Gansler author of, The Defense Industry
,
concurred with Mayer's quote by stating:
The efforts of legislators to keep their home-state or
home-district [sub-contract] suppliers in the defense
business make it difficult for a new supplier to replace
one that has such high level support. Congressmen will
often argue that it is in the interest of national security
to keep a particular supplier in business, even when he may
not have been the low bidder. Such arguments, passed down
to a prime contractor through the DoD from Congress, have
considerable weight. [Ref . 10 :p . 150]
This strategy of the prime contractor makes a great deal
of intuitive sense. By geographically distributing his
subcontracts across many states (and political districts) , he
enhances his program's potential for survival. This occurs
because now many different members of Congress with
subcontracts in their district have a vested interest in the
prime contractor's program.
It is an inexpensive and relatively easy acquisition
strategy for the prime contractor to implement . This low-
cost, low risk strategy helps the political stability of his
program. In today's constrictive fiscal environment, Program
Managers cannot afford to be on unstable political ground.
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Another reason why Congress is interested in
subcontractors instead of prime contractors is that they are
governed by different regulations. Prime contracting is
governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) , while
subcontracting is not. [Ref . 26 :p . 219] Therefore, members of
Congress seek out prime contractors in an effort to lure them
to hire subcontractors in their districts. Congress is
strictly forbidden to partake in this activity with prime
contractors under the provisions of the FAR. [Ref . 26 :p . 208]
To illuminate the importance of this fact consider a
contract that is awarded to a prime contractor. If other
prime contractors feel that the award process was unfair or
incorrect, they have rights under the FAR to protest its
award.
Subcontractors do not enjoy the same right to protest.
A prime contractor can hire any sub he desires. 2 Hence, if
a member of Congress is successful in luring a lucrative
subcontract to his district, the non-selected competitive
subcontractors have no method of recourse. The importance of
having a strong political backing for a program is fully
understood by the prime contractor. Mayer conducted a study
of three major ACAT programs: the B-l bomber, the Apache
2Prime Contractors may have clauses in their contract
stipulating certain requirements that the subcontractors must
fulfill. This is one technique used to fulfill quotas to small
businesses, labor surplus areas, businesses owned by women,
minorities, and other considerations.
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helicopter, and the DIVAD air defense gun. He discovered
that:
The three different defense systems examined here, of
different size, scope, and type, all show a high level of
geographic distribution of sub-contracts to forty-eight,
forty-five, and thirty-eight states....
....For each defense program, there are indications
that the work was spread over a wider area than required by
the scope of the program, and there is evidence that
subcontracts were purposely spread over the entire U.S.
Martin Marietta's activity on the Apache is an especially
clear case. [Ref . 26 :p . 230]
The military Program Manager will encourage any legal
activity that will enhance the probability of keeping his
program alive. It is safe to state that the PM will encourage
his prime contractor to be politically sensitive in selecting
his subcontractors. [ [Ref . 26 :p . 219]
As a political strategy, subcontract targeting is in
most cases superior to prime targeting. There are only so
many choice primes to go around. But one large prime
contract must be divided into thousands of subcontracts,
each of which can be used as an incentive or reward for
program support. There is little doubt that the Defense
Department encourages this type of activity by its primes.
[Ref .17:p.219]
A further look at the B-l bomber further illustrates
this point. An Air Force officer associated with the B-l
program stated that "one major goal of the program was to
distribute subcontracts throughout the country in a manner
designed to produce the most votes in Congress."
[Ref . 17 :p. 220] The B-l bomber's prime contractor has spread
their subcontracts over three hundred congressional districts
and forty-eight states.
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The fact that politics affect the acquisition process
cannot be disputed. Clearly, some political strategies are
more effective than others.
Congressmen cannot, as a rule, influence DoD source
selection decisions. Yet they can use the authorization
process to force the Pentagon to purchase specific systems,
and otherwise tinker with procurement policy to protect
constituent interests
.
Since prime contracts cannot be readily targeted [by
Congress], congressional efforts focus on subcontract
targeting. The latter is the preferred way to maximize
geographic and economic impact. [Ref . 17 :p. 230]
F . THE PROGRAM MANAGER' S ROLE
The Program Manager will have to be acutely aware of all
five external interfaces between Congress and the acquisition
process. Regardless of which phase the program is in, the PM
must be attuned to the potential influence that Congress may
have on his program. The PM will need to pay an equal amount
of attention to the internal activities within his program as
well as focusing on the external influence that Congress will
exude on his program. Exactly how the Program Manager
should execute a strategy to deal with this interaction will








This chapter will examine the nature of congressional
oversight and program intervention. The researcher believes
a historical analysis of the relationship between Congress and
the Department of Defense will assist the Program Manager in
understanding the environment his program will be developed
within
.
The researcher will also examine the oversight issue from
a congressional perspective. An understanding of the
acquisition problem from a congressional viewpoint may help
the members of the armed forces understand why Congress does
what it does . Understanding congressional motivation should
allow the Program Manager to be proactive towards
congressional oversight rather than reactive.
B. COST, SCHEDULE AND PERFORMANCE
Congress is specifically concerned with three factors
when examining the progress of an acquisition program: cost of
the system; the schedule of the program's development; and
performance characteristics the system is supposed to exhibit.
When a program exceeds costs, slips on its schedule, or does
not meet performance expectations, the program's shortfalls
may come to the attention of Congress.
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The Department of Defense Manual 5000. 2-M requires the
use of Selected Acquisition Reports to:
. . .provide standard, comprehensive summary reporting of
cost, schedule, and performance information for major
defense acquisition programs within the Department of
Defense and to Congress. The current estimate of total
program acquisition cost, schedule, and performance data is
compared against the Selected Acquisition Report baseline,
and a disciplined approach to the calculation and
categorization of variances is applied.
Quarterly Selected Acquisition Reports are submitted on
an exception basis when there has been a 15 percent or more
increase in program acquisition unit cost or current
procurement unit cost (in then-year dollars) , or a 6-month
or greater delay in the current estimate of any schedule
milestone since the previous Selected Acquisition Report.
[Ref .22:p.l7-l]
C. PERCEIVED DOD MISMANAGEMENT
Within a couple of years of President Reagan's major
increase in defense spending in the early 1980s, the press
began issuing reports of exorbitant pricing on DoD purchases
.
Much attention was focused on Senator Charles E. Grassley (R-
IA) when he released the discovery that the Air Force was
paying $916.55 for a small plastic cap for the leg of a
navigator's stool. The Project on Military Procurement, the
organization who provided the information to Senator Grassley,
was flooded with phone calls from congressional staffers who
wanted their own example of outrageous costs so that their
bosses could also get favorable press attention. The stories
were getting the Congressmen favorable reviews back home.
The April 13, 1985 issue of the Washington Post reported
about DoD pricing abuses that included examples of: $437
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hammers, $659 ashtrays, $640 toilet seats, $3,046 coffee
makers, $9,000 wrenches, and $748 duckbill pliers. Reports
such as these sent a negative message about DoD procurement
policies to the public and Congress. [Ref.27]
Most of the outrageous prices could be explained as the
Government's accepted method of applying overhead costs. But
those stories fell on the mute ears of the press, who at best
gave it back page coverage.
J. Ronald Fox author of The Defense Acquisition Process:
An Overview , states
:
Although television, radio, and print media repeatedly
contained reports of these high-priced items, they rarely -
if ever - explained that the high prices frequently had to
do with the allocation of overhead costs and the rigor of
military requirements as much as or more than they had to
do with implied contractor overcharges.
Government regulations require that overhead costs
(i.e., costs associated with more than one program) be
distributed in equal percentage among a contractor'
s
products. Under this system, prices for small items are
often artificially inflated and those for large items
artificially reduced. Overhead costs have to be absorbed
one way or another, but if the allocation system results in
pricing anomalies and is not adequately understood or
explained by the media, the public is misled. [Ref . 8:p.31]
The sensational news reports took the attention of the
public, DoD, and the Congress away from far greater cost
problems in the defense acquisition process. Fox explains:
Numerous researchers and presidential commissions
during the past twenty-five years have concluded repeatedly
that opportunities exist to save tens of billions of




Major presidential commissions dating back to 1949 have
indicated that billions of dollars could be saved by improving
the acquisition process. [Ref.8:p.l2]
Fox noted that the studies repeatedly urged Congress and
the Defense Department to correct five basic deficiencies:
1
.
Setting requirements for the most sophisticated system
attainable, often irrespective of cost;
2. Underestimated schedules and costs of major programs,
distorting the decision-making process for the allocation
of the national budget;
3. Changes in program and contract requirements caused by
changes in military user preferences, leading to annual or
more frequent changes in program funding levels, initiated
by Congress and DoD itself;
4 Lack of incentives for contractors and government
personnel to reduce program costs; and
5. Failure to develop sufficient numbers of military and
civilian personnel with training and experience in business
management and in dealing with industrial firms to oversee
the development and production of enormous, highly
technical industrial programs. [Ref.8:p.32]
Even with increasing defense budgets over the 198 0s,
major defense programs have continuously experienced schedule
delays and cost overruns.
Schedules have been extended by about 33 percent in
approximately one-half of the programs. Again, more than
nine in ten programs exceeded initial cost estimates, and
the average increase in cost for the majority has been more
than 50 percent, excluding the effects of quantity changes
and inflation. [Ref.ll]
Cost and schedule overruns or increases have been the
rule not the exception for many years. In the 1960s, no
single program came in at or below its projected cost. [Ref .4]
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Even though the 1960s and 70s had problems, they were nothing
in comparison to what occurred in the 1980s.
Examples of programs with cost increases in 1981 include:
[Ref .5]
- Navy's Aegis Cruiser program, $8.4 billion increase.
- Navy's current submarine, frigate and destroyer
programs, $42 billion increase.
- Navy's Trident program and Air Force's F-16 program,
$33 billion increase.
- Navy's 5-inch Guided Projectile program, more than
$300 million increase.
Navy's Tomahawk Cruise Missile program, $450 million
increase
.
Navy's frigate (FFG-7) program, $5 billion increase.
Army's heavy-tank (M-l) program, $13 billion increase.
Army's UH-60A helicopter program, $4.7 billion
increase
James Lindsay, author of the article, "Congressional
Oversight of the Department of Defense: Reconsidering the
Conventional Wisdom, " provides three historical examples of
oversight that are very illuminating:
A classic case of how parochial concerns led members
of Congress to review a DoD program was the 1982 Senate
debate over upgrading U.S. airlift capacity. In the
initial fiscal year 1983 defense budget, the Air Force
requested funds for both the C-5b (built by Lockheed) and
the C-17 (built by McDonnell Douglas) aircraft. Sen. Henry
Jackson (D-Wash.), however, convinced his colleagues on
SASC to buy Boeing 747s, which were built in his home
state, rather than C-5bs . This move touched off a furious
legislative battle between partisans of both companies. In
the end, Congress chose to proceed with the C-5b program,
but as a sop to Senator Jackson it also decided to buy
three used 747s (at a cost of $145 million) . Although this
battle produced what to many was wasteful defense spending
(i.e., the three 747s), it also focused high-level
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political attention on the whole issue of U.S. airlift
capacity
.
The A-10 close air support (CAS) aircraft provides a
second example of how parochial interests offer incentives
for congressional oversight . As the result of an
interservice agreement reached following its creation as a
separate service, the Air Force won responsibility for
providing CAS for army troops engaged in ground combat
.
The Air Force, however, traditionally has placed a low
priority on the CAS mission. In particular, it has been
reluctant to buy A-lOs, even though Army officials
repeatedly complain about a lack of CAS aircraft and even
though the A-10, which "has shown high operational
reliability and an excellent armor-killing capability, " is
considered by many weapons experts to be one of the best
weapons in the U.S. arsenal. Rep. Joseph Addabbo (D-N.Y.),
while chair of the House Appropriations Defense
Subcommittee (HADS) , however, succeeded in forcing the Air
Force to buy more A-lOs. In monitoring the issue of CAS,
Representative Addabbo had a clear incentive: the Grumman
Corporation, the prime contractor for the A-10, was based
in his district
.
The battle over the Navy's F/A-18 Hornet aircraft
offers a third example of how parochialism can stimulate
congressional oversight. The Hornet was initiated in the
mid-1970s as a dual-mission fighter/attack plane, but by
1980 questions had arisen about the feasibility of a dual
mission plane and about the rising cost of the program.
The Hornet's problems attracted criticism from
Representative Addabbo as well as from the second-most
senior member of HADS, Rep. William Chappell (D-Fla.) . In
1983, Addabbo and Chappell together led hearings into the
problems plaguing the F/A-18 program. In doing so, both
had a clear parochial interest in ferreting out the
Hornet's flaws. Many of Addabbo' s constituents worked for
the Grumman corporation, builder of the F-14 and A-6
aircraft, which the F/A-18 would replace. In Chappell'
s
case, Pratt and Whitney, which built engines for the F-14
and A-6 but not for the F/A-18, owns a plant in his home
state of Florida. [Ref . 19 :p. 19]
E. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO COST OVERRUNS
Congress responded to these cost overruns by increasing
and intensifying its oversight over DoD's acquisition
programs. Driven by increasing criticism of Congress' failure
to control DoD's wasteful spending, Congress crossed the fine
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line between oversight and micromanagement . Members of
Congress responded to the problem by increasing their own
involvement in the acquisition process. They now pursue
operational details in the procurement of weapon systems
versus setting broad policy goals for DoD
.
The authorizers and appropriators responded by a line
item by line item budget review process. "Appropriation line-
item adjustments doubled during the 1970' s and grew by another
85 percent between 1982 and 1987." [Ref.l8:p.6] In
criticizing the authorization process Senator Sam Nunn stated:
The Armed Services Committee now authorizes almost
every element of the defense budget each year, down to
almost the last screw and bolt. . . .At its worst this
tendency has spurred not unreasonable charges of
congressional "micromanagement" ... .But even more
troublesome, this trend to micromanagement has the staff
and members focusing on the grains of sand on the beach
while we should be looking over the broad ocean and beyond




Congress further responded to the public outcry for
acquisition reform by implementing legislation designed to
control the wayward acquisition process. Examples of
legislation that affects military procurement and a brief
description of each are listed below: [Ref . 15 :p . 157]
- Public Law 98-72 (1983) Improves small business access
to federal procurement information.
Public Law 98-94 (1983) Calls for the use of
independent cost estimates for major defense programs.
- Public Law 98-369 (1984) Requires competition in
defense contracting.
Public Law 98-473 (1984) Requires a competitive




Public Law 98-525 (1984) Requires the use of
prequalification procedures. It also established tours of
duty for program managers
.
- Public Law 98-577 (1984) Requires mandatory
publication of procurement regulations in the Federal
Register for a public comment period. It also requires
Small Business Administration representatives be placed in
major defense acquisition centers.
- Public Law 99-145 (1985) Describes allowable costs
under defense contracts
.
- Public Law 99-190 (1986) Requires employment of
Alaskan and Hawaiian residents in military construction
contracts in those states.
- Public Law 99-433 (1986) Organizes procurement policy
staffs of military departments at the secretarial level.
Public Law 99-500 (1986) Establishes the duties of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition.
Public Law 99-634 (1986) Prohibits subcontractor
kickbacks to Government prime contractors
.
- Public Law 100-180 (1987) Provides for congressional
oversight of cost/schedule variances in certain programs.
Public Law 102-202 (1987) Requires ten days
notification to Congress before the DoD terminates
multiyear contracts.
- The Conference Report on HR4264 (1988) requires:
* DoD profit policies be kept current.
* Establishment of the Public/Government Advisory
Committee
.
* Establishment of the Industry/Government Advisory
Committee
* The DoD to submit a report to Congress on
streamline acquisition procedures.
- The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act
(DAWIA) (1990) requires the following actions:
* Designate Acquisition Positions
* Specify Education, Training and Experience
Requirements
* Provide Career Paths
* Create Acquisition Corps
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* Identify Critical Acquisition Positions
* Implement Other Provisions
F. THE PUBLIC LAN 98-212 DISASTER
Every piece of legislation required the DoD to write
implementing regulations, (e.g., Federal Acquisition
Regulation) , further complicating the military acquisition
process. The use of legislation to govern the DoD's
acquisition programs sent a message to the DoD that they could
not be trusted to procure weapon systems . A White Paper
written to the President of the United States stated that the
first goal to establish effective military acquisitions is to
"re-establish trust between DoD and the Congress." [Ref.18]
The poor relations between the Pentagon and Congress
further complicated the Acquisition Process. Congress
perceived the Pentagon as noncooperative when implementing
legislation that the Department of Defense did not agree with.
An example of Congress enacting a well intended piece of
legislation with Department of Defense noncompliance is Public
Law 98-212 (1983) which requires the Department of Defense to
obtain warranties from defense contractors. The Tank and
Automotive Command complied with the legislative mandate by
paying for:
$23.6 million worth of warranties bought on six major
weapon systems. In 1984 and 1985, the army claimed only
$38,987 in reimbursements. The army paid $9.9 million in
warranties on its M-l tanks, but was reimbursed for only
$10,453 worth of claims by the end of the warranty period
in 1987. [Ref .15:p.l59]
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Clearly Congress did not foresee the poor return on the
warranty investment. If Congress knew that a piece of
legislation would end up needlessly costing the taxpayers more
money, they never would have enacted it. They believed they
were enacting a public law that would be in the country's best
interest. Congress instead enacted legislation that cost the
taxpayers millions of dollars. Congress should not hold the
sole blame for the failure of this program. The DoD should
share equal blame in the warranty plan failure. The
researcher learned during his nine years as an automotive,
tank, communication and weapon repair officer that warranties
are often not used. First, the typical maintenance soldier in
the field is unclear what is warranty work and what is not.
When a soldier works on a warrantied piece of equipment it
usually voids out the warranty. The soldier's chain-of-
command must share part of the blame for this activity. The
other part of the blame lies with the Program Office which
does not get the warranty information down to the user level
.
Another factor in the failure of Public Law 98-212 is
cultural climate within the command. Senior Military Service
Commanders do not want to hear that the repair of an
unserviceable piece of equipment has been delayed due to
warranty work by the contractor. They want their equipment
fixed and they want it fixed now. Equipment readiness rates
are of utmost importance to those commanders, as they are very
visible at the General/Admiral Officer level. It is the
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General Officer level that will write their Officer Evaluation
Reports. Consistent poor readiness rates could negatively
impact an officer's career through poor evaluation reports.
Hence, both the DoD and Congress can share in the blame
for Public Law 98-212' s failure. Mistakes of this magnitude
will only stop occurring when an atmosphere of honesty and
cooperation between the two organizations exists.
G. THE MICROMANAGEMENT TREND CONTINUES
The tendency for congressional micromanagement of military
operations shows no sign of lessening. In its report on the
Department of Defense Authorization for the fiscal year 1990,
the House Armed Services Committee made 215 requests on all
sorts of topics . An additional twenty such studies were
imposed during the debate on the House floor. [Ref.6]
If Congress does not modify the methods it uses to
micromanage the Department of Defense, no improvements in
relations will occur. The DoD must also make ernest attempts
to implement congressional legislation or the Congress will
continue the micromanagement of DoD activities. The ongoing
finger pointing and accusations between the two organizations
further decay the relationship.
H. HISTORICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
Both the DoD and Congress realize a solution to this
problem must be found. But, solutions to this problem have
been sought throughout the history of the United States. A
study of history gives us many examples of attempts to reform
the acquisition process:
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In the course of the French and Indian Wars, there were
frequent complaints about high prices and inferior goods
.
In 1861, Congress established a select committee to inquire
into allegations of waste and corruption involving military
contracts. After World War I, the Nye Committee held
highly publicized hearings on the same subject . During
World War II, the Truman Committee focused on shortcomings
in the war production effort. [Ref . 15 :p. 166]
Acquisition reform is nothing new to the defense
procurement process . Weidenbaum further suggests that
:
The most fundamental obstacle to improvement is the
absence of a single central problem that plagues the
defense procurement process . Consequently, there is no
single panacea, no single action that will eliminate all or
even most of the shortcomings in the military procurement
process. [Ref . 15 :p . 166]
An examination of the Packard Commission and 1990 White
Paper recommendations yield similar results and
recommendations. [Ref. 18] They include:
- Re-establishing of trust between the DoD and Congress;
- Lengthening the time horizon and reducing detail and
redundancy in the budget process;
- Focusing congressional oversight on more significant
aspects of defense policy;
- Better integrating congressional policy goals and
directives;
- Streamlining the regulations of the Government
procurement process;
- Upgrading the calibre of the people in the Department
of Defense who administer the regulations and carry
out the procurement process; and,
- Involving the people and organizations who actually
produce the equipment
.
This examination of historical acquisition reforms,
congressional oversight and micromanagement, has discovered
that many suggested solutions already exist to alleviate the
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acquisition problem. The Packard Commission suggestions
listed above are an example of some of these solutions. The
difficulty lies in the implementation of those solutions
.
The implementation can only occur when the DoD and Congress
develop a better working relationship, one focused on
providing world class weapon systems to the soldiers in the
field.
The bottom line is that the Program Manager must
understand the nature of congressional oversight . The PM will
become a better leader by understanding the nature of that
oversight. Through the use of proactive planning, the PM may
anticipate how congressional oversight may affect his program.
He can then plan strategies to deal with the interaction
before it actually occurs. This puts the Program Manager back
in control of his program. He is back in control because he
is devising the strategies to deal with that interaction,
rather than of reacting to oversight. A Program Manager who
simply reacts to external influences will never truly be in
control of his program.
The history of the acquisition legislation and studies
show that solutions to acquisition problems are at hand.
Murray Wiedenbaum author of, Small Wars, Big Defense - Paying
for the Military After the Cold War , summed up this point
well
:
Over the years, there has been no shortage of proposals
to revise the way that the Department of Defense makes its
purchases and indeed many changes have been made . The
recurrent dissatisfaction with the status quo is hardly of
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recent vintage. In the course of the French and Indian
Wars, there were frequent complaints about high prices and
inferior goods. In 1861, Congress established a select
committee to inquire into allegations of waste and
corruption involving military contracts. After World War
I, the Nye Committee held highly publicized hearings on the
same subject. During World War II, the Truman Committee
focused on shortcomings in the war production effort.
Perhaps the most fundamental obstacle to improvement is
the absence of a single central problem that plagues the
defense procurement process. Consequently, there is no
single panacea, no single action that will eliminate all or
even most of the shortcomings in the military procurement
process
.
. . . It will take at least three major types of changes
to truly reform military procurement. The first category
of reform is to streamline the regulations themselves,
eliminating counterproductive restrictions and stripping
out nonessential detail . The second is to upgrade the
calibre of the people in the Department of Defense who
administer the regulations and carry out the procurement
process. The third involves the people and organizations
who actually produce the equipment. [Ref . 15 :pp . 166-167]
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VI. PROGRAM MANAGER - PUPPET OR PUPPETEER
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines how the program manager should
anticipate and interact with Congress. It will also examine
the do's and don'ts of program management.
The major premise of this thesis is that the Program
Manager can influence all facets of his program. Most of the
time, he is not a victim of congressional directives. A
proactive and positive attitude will assist the PM in heading
off congressional problems before they occur. PMs who respond
in a reactive manner will never be in control of their
programs
.
Congress, and the politics included in that legislative
body, influence the military acquisition process. The budget
and oversight functions of Congress will affect military
acquisition programs. The Program Manager who understands the
nature of that interaction, can best anticipate its
occurrence
.
B. IDEAS FOR THE PROGRAM MANAGER
1 . The Mental Process
First and foremost, the Program Manager is in charge
of his program. He is ultimately responsible for developing
a program that will meet all cost, schedule and performance
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criteria. A strong leader can direct his program through the
dynamic acquisition environment . A weak Program Manager will
become bogged down in the bureaucracy of a very complicated
process
.
The PM must keep in mind that he has a formal chain
of command to answer to. He must also realize that influences
outside of his chain of command will affect the development of
his program. Congress is one of those organizations that will
affect a program's progress. Certain leadership traits to
include honesty, forthrightness and common sense, will have to
be exhibited by the PM should it become necessary to respond
to congressional directives. PMs who work well with Congress
can actually strengthen their programs.
2 . Honesty and Forthrightness
Honesty and forthrightness are of bedrock importance
in order to build a credible relationship with Congress.
Without credibility the PM will be unable to influence
Congress or effectively run his program.
Loyalty to the program should not be allowed to cloud
the truth. If the program is experiencing cost overruns,
schedule delays or performance shortfalls, the PM should be
up-front with his difficulties. The ingrained "can do"
attitude of military officers needs to be realistically
adjusted to account for the inexact science of acquisition
management. No one who works within the acquisition process
realistically expects no setbacks in a program's development.
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If a congressman or staffer asks a question about a
program, honest answers should be developed in a timely manner
without giving additional information or being overzealous in
promoting the program. Promises or commitments that will be
extremely difficult to fulfill should not be made.
It is also important when a request for information
comes from Congress that the PM ask himself, "why is this
question being asked"? The question may include a hidden
agenda that requires a response with either sensitive and/or
special phrasing. The PM, once again, when phrasing his
response must focus only on answering the question being
asked. Even though the PM truly believes he has nothing to
hide, added information invites further questions and
attention from the congressman's office.
If an answer is not available in a timely manner, an
interim response that an answer is forthcoming should be made.
The PM should focus his immediate efforts to ensure that a
thorough and timely response is being drafted. A response
should never leave a PM' s office without being checked for
accuracy
.
Accuracy alone is not enough to ensure a response to
a congressional inquiry is adequate. The routing of that
response is equally as sensitive. The Program Manager's
formal chain of command must be kept informed of all
congressional inquiries. Either the Program Executive Officer
(PEO) or the Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) may have
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further insight into the nature of the inquiry. Their
guidance may be necessary in order to draft an adequate
response. The chain of command should never be surprised by
a response to Congress that was routed around their attention.
An appropriate response should be routed through the chain-of-
command to the Office of Legislative Affairs or Public Affairs
Office as appropriate to the situation.
A wise PM will also attempt to determine how much
information Congress already has about the subject matter.
Existing reports and testimony to Congress may make your
response appear inaccurate or inconsistent with existing
facts. Understanding the congressional information base will
also assist the PM in drafting his response to Congress.
Congressmen, similar to military General/Flag Rank Officers,
often ask questions to which they already know the answers. It
would be remiss by the PM to assume that all congressional
questions are strictly related to fact finding. The question
may be a challenge of a PM' s credibility, knowledge,
integrity, or simply an attempt to develop the public record
on a matter that is of interest to Congress.
3 . Common Sense and Knowledge
The Program Manager needs to make every effort to
understand the environment within which his program exists.
He needs to acquire technical knowledge about his project.
While it is not necessary or feasible that he obtain the same
technical level that his system and functional engineers
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obtain, he does need to be able to speak intelligently about
his program. He especially needs to be able to technically
address the problem areas in his program. The PM needs to be
able to explain problems to interested parties outside the
program as well as intelligently discuss them with his own
engineers
.
Equally as important, the PM needs to learn about the
political environment that he is developing his program
within. Now more than ever, it takes a politically savvy PM
to deliver a weapon system to the field. It is important to
discern the difference between being politically aware and
engaging in illegal or unwise activities. Being politically
aware means that the PM must have a knowledgeable, common
sense understanding about the nature of PM/congressional
interactions
.
The PM must also fully understand the DoD 5000 series
manuals, the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and the Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement in order to
implement the regulations that govern acquisitions. Those
regulations provide the framework within which acquisition
programs must be developed. Any deviations from those
regulations could place the PM and the acquisition program in
jeopardy
.
If the PM feels the program is entering into an
activity that may be construed as being improper, he should
first obtain legal counsel or consult an ethics officer as
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appropriate. Perceptions of impropriety can be as damaging to
the PM as actual improprieties. No activities should be
engaged in by the PM that approach any "grey areas" of
propriety, without first obtaining a legal or ethical opinion.
The PM will have to rely on his knowledge of the regulations
and common sense to determine when this point has been
reached.
Another common sense strategy the PM can engage in is
the congressional education process. In order to begin such a
risk management strategy, the PM needs to identify all the
legislators that could potentially have an interest in his
program and the nature of their concern. The PM should
identify congressmen with prime and subcontractors linked to
the PM' s program, that reside within their states or
districts . He should further identify the congressmen who
serve on the defense Authorizing and Appropriating Committees
in Congress. Knowing which committees and subcommittees have
potential interest in defense contracting activities will
assist the PM in answering congressional inquiries directed to
the program. Having an idea of what the legislator is trying
to accomplish with a legislative inquiry will assist the PM in
composing an appropriate response.
The list of legislators will provide a risk
management tool that will provide important information to the
Program Manager. The more the PM understands about the
political environment the better. It is that knowledge that
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will also assist the program manager in developing an
acquisition strategy to deal with the political environment.
Knowledge of potential congressional inquiries places the PM
in a proactive strategy mode rather than a reactive one.
C. EDUCATING CONGRESS
The successful Program Manager must be an effective
salesman and proponent of his program. When used
appropriately, a PM can gain valuable support through the
education of members of Congress and their staffers.
1 . The Education Process
The education process can take many forms and
methods. The most common method used by the military to
educate is the formal briefing process. A formal briefing,
when effectively constructed and properly delivered, can be a
powerful tool in selling a program.
The Program Manager should compose a briefing that
focuses in on specific facts he wants to relay about his
program. It is important to remember when composing the
briefing that advocacy is desirable, cheerleading is not. The
members of DoD, Congress and their staffs can easily tell the
difference between the two. A cheerleading PM will attempt to
sell their program at all costs. Their desire for the program
to succeed will cloud other pertinent issues. They will
attempt to guide the briefing around the negative aspects of
his program. Those negative items brought up by the audience
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will quickly be glossed over as either incorrect or
insignificant. This kind of false optimism will probably be
transparent to the audience. A cheerleading PM jeopardizes
his credibility and that of his Program.
A PM who is an advocate of his program will be most
effective by providing a truthful, forthright and factual
account of the status of his program. The briefing will
provide information about the weapon system' s ability to meet
the mandated requirements . He will avoid making operational
promises that are not realistic. The PM will also be able to
address any problem areas in regards to cost, schedule or
performance aspects of his programs.
It is in the briefing process of congressmen and
their staffers that credibility is developed for the PM and
his program. A Program Manager who has done his research
about his program, the political environment, and delivers an
effective presentation will be positively received.
Credibility carries a lot of weight on Capitol Hill. Once
credibility has been lost, it is difficult, if not impossible
to regain.
An effective Program Manager will carefully tailor
the content of his briefing for the audience he is going to
present it to. A personalized approach that presents the
right information to the right group of people also develops
credibility. For example, a member of Congress who sits on
one of the Budget Committees will be far more interested in
73
the program' s budget data than a member of Congress who sits
on an agriculture committee. Here is where the PM's research
into the political environment will pay great dividends.
Many times during a briefing, a question will be
raised for which an accurate response may not be readily
available. It is much better to defer answering a question
than provide a piece of inaccurate information. It is
important that an accurate follow-on answer is provided in a
timely manner.
It is a must to have a person sit in on the briefing
to take notes of such questions . The note taker must be sure
to take an accurate account of the question and to obtain from
a staffer the name, address and phone number of the person who
asked the question. A brief- . who is focused on his
presentation can easily forget questions or salient points
that are raised further illuminating the need for clerical
assistance
.
2 . The Incorrect Education Process
The Program Manager must avoid the pitfall of
briefing the requirements instead of briefing the program.
The requirements are not set by the program office. They are
instead formulated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
who then forwards it to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition for approval or disapproval. A Program Manager's
job is to develop a program that meets the requirement, not to
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promote or defend the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition's requirement.
Another potential pitfall is the improper use of the
chain of command. The proper use of the chain of command is
as valuable to the acquisition community as it is to enlisted
service members . Even though the PM may believe he has the
best program in the armed forces, he must conduct business
within the chain of command. PMs absolutely must avoid the
temptation to personally contact legislators outside the chain
of command to advocate their programs. If they are contacted
by a member of Congress, they should report the occurrence
through the chain of command to keep them informed. Even
though the PM may be frustrated with the bureaucratic process,




To an outside observer the aforementioned suggestions may
appear simplistic or mundane. The suggestions are not so
simple to personnel who work within the culture of the armed
forces. Every new officer in the military is quickly
ingrained into the culture of the military. That culture
which centers around mission accomplishment, provides a
*It is the researcher's contention that every person working
within the acquisition bureaucracy must work to reform it. If the
PM is frustrated with the system, steps should be taken to change
it. As the PM encounters unnecessary bureaucratic procedures, he
should initiate change documentation to the governing regulation.
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dilemma for the military acquisition Program Manager. The
43rd Edition of The Army Officer' s Guide states:
All officers of the armed forces, and all soldiers too,
are bound by their Oath to do their utmost to achieve the
prompt and successful completion of the mission assigned,
even at the risk of their lives when necessity requires,
and without regard to their personal views as to the
correctness of the national policy or the wisdom of the
orders under which they act. [Ref.l6:p.7]
The researcher has learned from ten years of personal
experience that the above quote is the main driving force in
every successful Army officer's career. It is the very drive
for mission accomplishment that creates a dichotomy of purpose
for the military Program Manager.
On one hand, the PM wants to deliver his weapons system
to the service member in the field. He fully believes that
the soldier deserves only the best systems for the next war.
Motivated by that thought, he drives his program forward to
fielding. The PM will accept nothing less than a quality
product built within cost, on schedule, and able to meet all
performance characteristics. Anything short of meeting those
goals would mean failure to the PM.
Program Managers are a very successful, select group of
officers and civilians. All must have a solid performance
history to attain a position of such responsibility. None of
the Program Managers are accustomed to failure. Herein lies
the dichotomy for the military officer. Given the mission to
develop a weapon system, the PM executes a strategy to
succeed. If the PM was allowed to operate in a vacuum with
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total control of his program, there is little doubt he would
succeed. Unfortunately for the PM, the real world is not so
simplistic
.
Many external influences to the program exist that are
beyond the immediate control of the PM. This sets up a
scenario that military officers are unfamiliar with. They are
used to directing and controlling all their assets for mission
accomplishment
.
The external influences a Program Manager may experience
include the following:
- Technical problems with the prime or subcontractor.
- Schedule delays from the contractors
.
- Cost overruns that exceed budget allocations
.
- Budget cuts from the Department of Defense.
- The failure of Congress to authorize or appropriate
their program.
- Government test agencies who dictate what criteria the
system must meet to pass Operational Test (OT)
requirements. The same type of independent test
agency conducts and evaluates the test independent of
the program.
- Time sensitive inquiries from members of Congress or
their staffers that take the PM' s time to respond.
This list details just a few of the external influences
that the Program Manager may encounter. The bottom line is
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that these influences are virtually out of the PM' s control.
The fact remains that the Program Manager must deal with these
influences as they occur. A proactive PM will attempt to
intercede and avoid problems before they happen. Once again
knowledge about the political and legal environment within
which his program exists will allow the PM to devise an
acquisition strategy that effectively navigates these
obstacles
.
Honest and open communication between the prime
contractor and the program office is critical. A good PM can
offer ideas and suggestions to assist the prime and
subcontractor with their problems . The PM should have a broad
pool of technical experts with a wide breadth of experience
and knowledge to draw upon. The PM will strengthen his
program by strategically using his personnel assets to assist
with contractor problems
.
The prudent Program Manager also realizes that problems
will occur. The PM may experience problems for which no
reasonable solution is in sight . When this type of problem
exists, the PM should be wary of optimistic contractor
promises
.
The contractor does not want to have their contract
terminated. When the situation gets desperate they may make
promises that may not be realistic. When this occurs the PM
must inform the chain of command of the problem.
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Program setbacks must not be perceived by the PM as being
a failure. Senior acquisition officials realize that problems
will occur. They want to be informed when things go awry.
They do not want to be surprised at a later date when nothing
can be done to help. This may be construed by senior officers
as an unforgivable failure.
E. CONCLUSION
The contention of this chapter is that the Program
Manager will experience influences outside of the program
office. The chain of command, Congress, contractors and test
agencies can all affect the management of a program. These
external agencies may make decisions about a program that the
PM has little or no input into.
The fact remains that the Program Manager must deal with
that influence as it occurs . The PM that is attuned to the
potential for external influence on their program will be able
to plan for their effects before they occur.
One strategy available to the Program Manager is to
educate the decision makers before they interact and affect
the PM' s program. Through that education process, the
decision makers will decide first hand the merits of the PM'
s
program. The PM' s desired outcome of the education process is
to have informed decision makers as well as proponents to the
program.
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Scenario
The challenges facing Program Managers are difficult, yet
surmountable. A PM who makes the effort to learn about his
environment, will be best prepared to deal with it. Once he
understands the acquisition environment, he will be able to
use that knowledge to further strengthen his program.
Understanding the external interactions that exist within that
environment will be necessary for the PM to effectively deal
with them.
The successful Program Manager will also need to remain
flexible as his environment changes. Bold initiatives that
will "rock" the acquisition community at its very foundation
are now under consideration. For example, the 24 January,
1992, New York Times reports:
In a shift that could save billions of dollars in
future military spending, the Pentagon plans to suspend
production of most new weapons after developing test
models, senior Defense Department officials said today.
The production phase is by far the most expensive stage
in buying a new weapon, consuming 35 to 45 percent of the
total cost, while the research, design and development of
test models, or prototypes, usually represents 20 to 25
percent
.
Congress will ultimately decide whether the new plan
goes into effect through its control over the Pentagon
budget, and opposition appears likely because lawmakers,
while generally favoring cuts in military spending, do not
like to slash weapons manufacturing that benefits their
districts and states. [Ref.23:p.l]
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Revolutionary policy changes like this will demand that
Program Managers become very innovative and flexible. Program
Managers will have to have foresight to develop strategies to
deal with these changes before they occur.
The acquisition environment today is clearly dynamic not
static. Learning about, and planning for the new environment
is necessary for successful program management in the future.
B. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION
What is the effect that Congress has on the Military
Acquisition Process?
Congress has both a macro and micro relationship with the
Department of Defense acquisition process. It has a macro
relationship from the standpoint that it creates legislation
that has overall acquisition policy implications.
When Congress enacts authorizing and appropriating
legislation that is not at the line item level, the
relationship remains at the macro level . Once Congress begins
authorizing and appropriating by line items, or engaging in
oversight activities, the relationship turns micro. At this
point, congressional interest may be directed towards a
specific acquisition program.
The importance of the Budget Resolution cannot be
understated at this point. It is the Resolution which sets
the annual funding levels for the Department of Defense. When
Congress makes significant cuts in the defense budget as is
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occurring now, it will result in DoD defense acquisition
program terminations and cutbacks.
These cuts are becoming so severe that it is forcing the
Department of Defense to rethink its entire strategy on
defense acquisitions. Proposals from the Department of
Defense recommend that new weapons system acquisitions proceed
only after a research and development prototype is produced.
The technology would then be shelved until the need arises to
produce the system. The Office of Assistant Secretary of
Defense reports
:
The administration is seeking $267.6 billion in DoD
budget authority for fiscal year 1993, $9.9 billion below
the budget passed by Congress for FY 1992 and a decline of
seven percent in real terms, adjusted for inflation. The
cuts in the defense budget go beyond the steep cuts already
undertaken - amounting to a decline in budget authority of
over one-third in real terms since 1985.
[Ref .25:p.l]
The proposed cuts will completely change the way the
military acquisition community and Program Manager conducts
their business . Instead of focusing on providing weapon
systems to the field, they will be concerned with providing
prototypes that they believe will be producible.
The decision to proceed with this type of acquisition
strategy will initially reside with Congress. They will
decide, with the input of the Department of Defense, whether
this is a viable concept to pursue. The President will then
have the ultimate decision through the use of his veto power.
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This will be a difficult decision for Congress to make.
Many legislators will be torn between enacting a defense
policy they believe is correct or defending the parochial
interests of the defense contractors in their legislative
areas
.
The military Program Manager is virtually at the mercy of
the broad macro congressional-DoD relationship. But when the
relationship turns micro between Congress and his program, the
scenario changes. Once the Program Manager finds himself
under the congressional oversight microscope, he is in a
position to influence the oversight process. The manner in
which the PM responds to a congressional inquiry may well
determine how Congress responds in kind. If Congress is given
satisfactory answers to their questions, the program may
proceed as planned.
Conversely, we learned from the examples of the C-17, A-
10, and F/A-18 in Chapter V that members of Congress can have
hidden agendas behind the oversight process. In this type of
oversight, the PM is a small player in a much larger issue.
Here the PM can only provide factual responses to be used by
the legislators as they see fit. The congressional -
Department of Defense - Program Manager relationship is very
complex. Even as these interactions are occurring, it might
be impossible for the PM to determine why.
The PM' s preparation to attempt to deal with this
oversight must begin long before it occurs. Thorough research
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should be conducted by the PM to learn about Congress and the
environment within which the program exists . He needs to
understand which members of Congress might have an interest in
his program. He then specifically should try to understand
the nature of that interest
.
Once congressional oversight begins, the PM with an
understanding of that interaction will be best prepared to
deal with it. His research may reveal the nature of specific
congressional inquiries. The inquiry may be related to formal
House Or Senate Armed Services Committee oversight activities.
The inquiry could also be related to the parochial interests
of a legislator's district.
Only when the PM understands why a question is being
asked can an appropriate response be drafted. If the PM
understands the nature of a question, he can address the
specifics of that particular issue. This may require the
Program Manager to analyze the request in conjunction with
which committees and sub-committees the legislator sits on.
It may require further research into the legislator's district
and how that might be linked to the response.
A well written response issued through the correct
information chain will assist the PM in accomplishing his
ultimate goal. That goal, as articulated by LTG August M.
Cianciolo, Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the
Army (Research, Development and Acquisition), is to:
Provide our soldiers world class equipment in
sufficient quantity and in the shortest possible time,
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consistent with sound business practices and within
affordability constraints. 1
C. SUBSIDIARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1 . During what specific phases of the acquisition
process do Congress and the DoD service officials interface?
a. The Budget
The overall relationship between Congress and
the DoD acquisition community is primarily a "macro" one. The
relationship turns "micro" when the oversight committees of
Congress review defense programs
.
The annual budget process is the one of the most
visible interactions between Congress and the DoD. The
Department of Defense facilitates the budget process through
the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)
.
It was Secretary of Defense McNamara who
realized that a formal system of planning would be necessary
to accomplish the budgeting task. He developed the Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System which coordinates defense
planning efforts at the national level of the civilian and
military organization.
The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
is simply a decision-making process for allocating defense
resources. The process takes almost two years to complete and
involves four major players at the Washington D.C. level
xAs presented by LTG August M. Cianciolo during a briefing to
the Army Acquisition students on 12 Feb., 1992, at the Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
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(Office of Management and Budget, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the individual Armed
Services) . These organizations, through an iterative process,
move from broad planning considerations to more definitive
program objectives to finally specific budget estimates which
price out the programs
.
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
(PPBS) can be summarized in a few words. Based on the
anticipated Threat, a Strategy is developed. Requirements of
the strategy are then estimated and Programs are developed to
package and execute the strategy. Finally, the costs of
approved programs are Budgeted.
There are three phases to the Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System:
1. A planning phase, where the global threat is assessed
and strategy to meet the threat is defined. Most of the
planning function is conducted by high level military
officials in the Pentagon and White House. The goal of this
phase is to ensure that the nation' s defense needs are
provided for.
2. A programming phase, which translates the strategic
plans into programs defined in terms of forces, personnel,
material, and dollars.
3. A budgeting phase, which expresses the programs in
terms of biennial funding requirements. In the budgeting
phase, program needs for the year(s) for which the budget is
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being developed are expressed by appropriation as required by
Congress. As it is being developed, the service budgets
undergo vigorous internal Departmental and DoD review,
analysis, justification, and revision. The defense budget is
then incorporated into the President's budget and is presented
to Congress in January.
The first step Congress takes in the budget
process is to write the Concurrent Budget Resolution. The
Budget Resolution is the responsibility of the House and
Senate Budget Committees. The Budget Resolution is the
document that sets funding ceilings for major funding areas on
the nation's budget. It also establishes revenue targets that
are used to fund the budget. Stanley Collender author of, The
Guide To The Federal Budget , describes the Congressional
Budget Resolution:
The congressional budget resolution is Congress's
budget. It sets the total level of budget authority,
outlays, and revenues (and, therefore, the deficit or
surplus) , and determines priorities by dividing these
totals among the budget functions. The major purpose of
the budget resolution is to provide a fiscal blueprint for
all congressional committees; once it is adopted it will be
used through the year to determine whether spending and
revenues comply with the limits being set. [Ref . 24 :p . 49]
The Department of Defense is primarily
interested in the budget authority for the defense function.
This amount includes the entire amount of money that will be
provided to the Defense Department for the fiscal year.
Unlike the Authorizing and Appropriating Committees, the House
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and Senate Budget Committees avoid setting spending limits on
specific defense programs.
The authorizing committees then draft
legislation providing the DoD with authority to establish or
maintain acquisition programs. The legislation will provide
funding levels in specific amounts or less specific amounts to
ensure the program can be implemented. The authorization
process does not create budget authority though. Budget
authority is authorized through the approval of the
appropriation legislation.
The trend since the Armed Services Committees'
inception in 1946 has been to increase its line item reviews
of the authorizing legislation. This line-item oversight
actually authorizes some DoD programs individually. When this
occurs, the authorization committees move their relationship
with the DoD into the micro category.
The next major step in the budget process lies
with the Appropriation Committees of Congress. The
Appropriation Committees draft five appropriation bills that
affect the DoD. The DoD acquisition community is primarily
concerned with the Department of Defense Appropriation Bill
.
It is that piece of legislation that funds or
grants budget authority to DoD acquisition programs. If an
acquisition program has congressional interest, it will be




It is physically impossible for every member of
Congress to review every piece of legislation they must
consider. That is why most pieces of legislation have an
accompanying report that condenses the contents of the bill
.
Many times a piece of legislation will not appear to contain
specific guidance concerning a DoD acquisition program. This
guidance may be found in the accompanying report to the
legislation. Although these reports are not law, Congress
expects the DoD to heed the report's guidance.
b. The Acquisition Phases
Congress can influence the acquisition process
throughout the entire life-cycle of an acquisition program.
The interaction occurs throughout the budgeting and oversight
functions of Congress. For either policy, parochial, or
reelection purposes, members of Congress may have an interest
in an acquisition program whenever they desire.
The nature of the congressional interaction is
very complex. Specific congressional committees have
responsibility for formal oversight of the acquisition
process. Their ability to conduct the oversight function is
significantly limited due to time available to the legislator.
Time constraints make it impossible for members of Congress to
oversee every acquisition program. Legislatively mandated
reports like the Selected Acquisition Report, give Congress
visibility of program cost, schedule or performance problems.
This quarterly report alerts legislators to problems on an
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exception basis only. No oversight system exists within
Congress to evaluate every acquisition program.
Congress does appear to pay particularly close
attention to new program starts. They eventually review the
request for a new program start as a portion of the
President's budget. After a concurrent budget resolution is
drafted, defense hearings are conducted, authorization and
appropriation legislation is passed, and the President
approves the budget, a new program initiation normally begins.
Once the program is funded and it passes a Milestone I review,
the program is formally initiated.
Informal oversight can also occur throughout the
life-cycle of an acquisition program. Members of Congress
outside of the formal oversight review committees may also
have interests in specific acquisition programs. Parochial
interests may drive oversight
.
c . Oversight and Micromanagement
The other primary relationship between Congress
and the DoD involves the oversight of DoD acquisition
programs. When Congress conducts the oversight function, a
"micro" relationship begins to exist.
The Program Manager is acutely aware when
Congress takes an interest in his program. Inquiries from
members of Congress or their staffers will indicate for one
reason or another, that congressional interest is focused on
his program.
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2 . What is the nature of this interaction? What are the
purposes and implications of this interaction? What is the
motivation behind congressional action?
Members of Congress have various motivations to
oversee Department of Defense operations. First, most members
of Congress are genuinely concerned with the defense of our
country. They want to ensure that the DoD is properly
implementing the policies that Congress has mandated. They
also want to make sure that the taxpayers are getting their
money's worth in defense acquisitions.
Second, and possibly equally as important as the
first, members of Congress want to be reelected. Oversight
activities may serve as a powerful tool in a reelection
campaign. James Lindsay points out:
Because legislators need to win reelection to remain in
Congress, they often pursue oversight activities with an
eye toward potential political profit. [Ref.l9:p.7]
Constituents look favorably toward congressmen who
expose fraud, waste or abuse cases within DoD acquisitions.
The exposed activity gives the taxpayer the impression that
someone is watching out for their tax dollars.
Third, we must remember the importance of the
committee system in Congress . Committees charged with the
oversight of the Department of Defense, primarily the Armed
Services and Appropriations Committees, do so with great
diligence. The committees conduct the oversight function
through hearings on defense issues, occasional visits to
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defense plants and facilities, and spot checks on potential
problem programs. It is important to not assume that Congress
has a systematic method of overseeing all DoD activities. The
job is much too vast with the time constraints placed on the
legislators
.
The final motivator is perhaps the much publicized,
"pork-barrel politics." Every member of Congress wants to
bring home to their constituents a piece of the Defense
Department's budget. The desire to fulfill parochial
interests is closely linked with their desire to be reelected.
They assume that the defense contracts brought home will
equate to votes later.
While it is illegal for members of Congress to
tamper with the acquisition contract award process, they can
attempt to pass legislation written in such a manner that
encourages the DoD to award contracts in a specific area or
even to a specific contractor.
3. How Hill the Project/Program Manager benefit from
understanding the role of Congress? Can congressional
intervention be anticipated? What Program Manager response to
congressional intervention would be considered appropriate?
A Program Manager who understands the connection
between his program and Congress will clearly be ahead of the
PM who does not. A PM who is aware of that relationship will
understand how Congress as an external influence can affect
his program.
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Research into Congress should focus on individual
legislators who support or criticize his program and the basis
for this interest. He should analyze legislators that have a
parochial interest in his program. Research should also
identify the committees and subcommittees that affect his
program. Understanding which legislators sit on these
committees and subcommittees will assist the PM in proper
formulation of responses to congressional inquiries.
It is true that many congressional activities
affecting a PM' s program will be beyond his control. The PM
must understand that this will occur, and then deal with it.
An analysis of the nature of that interaction may illuminate
why this interaction took place. If the stimulus that set off
the congressional interaction occurred within the program
office, the PM may be able to preclude it from occurring
again
.
Understanding why activities occur within Congress
will allow the proactive PM to possibly anticipate
congressional interactions with his program. Foresight of
such interactions will allow the PM to create strategies to
deal with the interaction before it occurs.
Establishing links within the military service
congressional liaison offices may be very beneficial. They
may be a great source of information of activities on Capital
Hill. The contacts on Capital Hill should be used for
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information purposes only, not as a means to bypass the chain
of command.
When a Program Manager receives an inquiry from
Congress, two important steps need to occur. First, the PM
must ensure a timely and factually accurate response is
drafted. The PM should carefully consider why the legislator
is asking this particular question. The response should be
tailored to meet the perspective of the legislator. It should
then be routed through the chain of command and appropriate
Office of Legislative Affairs or Public Affairs Office.
The response should answer only the question being
asked. By rendering additional information, the PM risks
further legislative interest and questions . Overly optimistic
or conjectural answers should be avoided. The PM must ensure
his response is factual and realistic.
4 . Are there historical examples that illuminate
congressional effects on the acquisition process?
Congressional oversight can be both useful and
unnecessary, frugal and wasteful, desired and undesired.
History of oversight shows us that all of the above is true.
Program Managers need to study and learn from the historical
examples of oversight. They especially need to understand the
nature of that oversight. They then need to extrapolate that
information to determine if any of those reasons for oversight
apply to their program. By identifying the potential for
oversight early, they can create strategies to deal with it.
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The examples of the C-17, A-10 and F/A-18 discussed in
Chapter V, illustrate some of the means and ends of
congressional oversight. The greater understanding the
Program Manager has about this interaction, the better he will
be able to anticipate its occurrence.
D. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The congressional - Department of Defense relationship is
very complex. Congress, a political organization, relies on
the committee system to conduct its work. Committees and Sub-
Committees are specifically devoted to the defense activity.
The committees consist of individual legislators with various
policy and parochial agendas that guide them.
The oversight and budgeting functions are the primary two
sources of congressional and DoD interactions. They are also
the primary reasons the military acquisition Program Manager
has interactions with Congress.
There are occasions, out of the control of the Program
Manager, that Congress will direct a military acquisition
program to take a specific course of action. This type of
interaction is usually in the form of authorizing or
appropriating legislation.
There are other interactions, primarily during oversight,
where the Program Manager may be a participant . How
successful the PM is during this interaction depends on the
amount and type of preparation the PM used in anticipation of
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the event. If the PM studied the composition of Congress to
include committees and sub-committees , the environment his
program is being developed within, the intricacies of his
program, an examination of historical examples of oversight,
he should be well prepared to effectively respond to and
understand that interaction.
There is a strategy a Program Manager can engage in that
may make congressional oversight unnecessary. That strategy
revolves around the education of the members of Congress and
their staff. Through the use of military briefings, Program
Managers may have the opportunity to brief members of Congress
about their programs. This education process allows the PM to
inform the legislative decision makers about the attributes of
their program. The goal of the education process is to inform
as well as persuade the audience. If a member of Congress has
confidence in the Program Manager and the program, it may
divert his oversight attention elsewhere.
The current acquisition environment is very dynamic.
Recommendations have been made by the Department of Defense to
develop weapons systems through the research and development
prototype stage. The prototypes would then be shelved until
a need arises for their production. Concepts such as these
will challenge the resourcefulness of the Program Manager of
the future. The bottom line is that a careful analysis of the
changing acquisition environment will have to be conducted by
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There are many ways a Program Manager can learn about the
acquisition environment. Practical experience, selected
acquisition readings, C-SPAN coverage of legislative
acquisition events, are just a few of the resources available
to the PM.
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on the Department of Defense and the Congress, " January,
1990.
American Forces Information Service, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense - Public Affairs, "Early
Bird Publication, " (AFIS/OASD-PA)
.
Defense Systems Management College, "Congressional
Involvement and Relations, A Guide for DoD Managers,
"
DTIC/NTIS - ADA 214-408, 1989.
Defense Systems Management College, "Program Manager, "
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402-9371.
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